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Federal income tax reform is much talked about these days. No 
longer the sole province of the person with a professional interest in 
the tax system, tax reform is discussed, at some level or other, by peo-
ple in every walk of life. This recent popularity is due largely to the 
widespread unpopularity of the current system. This popularity is also 
responsible, unfortunately, for making large-scale, reflective, and sys-
temically coherent reform highly unlikely, and for ensuring that fre-
quent, politically motivated, piecemeal legislative change will 
continue. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 probably illustrates the most 
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to be hoped for in the present climate.1 Nonetheless, talk of real re-
form will surely persist, and theoreticians of tax policy will continue to 
do the hard work that ought to underlie tax reform. 
Despite the skepticism revealed by the above remarks, this article, 
too, is a plea for reform. It is not, however, directed at the ills that 
have stirred public discontent and made tax reform such a popular 
topic. Instead, it addresses the conceptual features that characterize 
the federal income tax system as a system. I am interested in changing 
the way we think about certain fundamental aspects of any income tax 
system and thereby in clarifying the way we describe, explain, under-
stand, and argue about our own system, whatever it may look like at a 
particular time. Call this an argument for conceptual reform. 
Serious normative discussion about our tax system typically falls 
into one of two broad spheres. The first is concerned principally with 
the interpretation of existing law. Such discussions are normative be-
cause they attempt to establish how a particular circumstance or sort 
of circumstance ought to be treated by the tax law as it in fact exists. 
This sort of normative discussion is very common, since a salient char-
acteristic of federal income tax law is the frequent opportunity for dis-
agreement about the details of its application. Arguments about the 
actual intent or content of the Code, Regulations, administrative posi-
tions, and case law fall within this category. 
The second sphere of discussion is more obviously normative, en-
compassing accounts of what the tax law ought to be. Usually these 
fall under the broad rubric of discussions of "tax policy." In this 
group I include discussions of the hard questions surrounding social 
and economic goals, political expediency, administrability, and other 
questions concerning the proper role in society of the tax rules, their 
effects, or both. I conceive of policy questions as those focusing on 
what makes a good system or good rule or set of rules within a system. 
Policy discussions can concentrate on asking what the goals of the set 
of tax rules ought to be as well as on asking how best to implement 
particular goals. 
The distinction between discussions that purport to be about how 
existing law should be interpreted and those that purport to be about 
1. For a brief and characteristically wise account of the nature of the reform achieved by the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986, see Bittker, Tax Reform - Yesterday, Today, and Tomo"ow, 44 
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 11 (1987). For a lively account of the background to the 1986 legislation, 
see Chirelstein, Backfrom the.Dead: How President.Reagan Saved the Income Tax, 14 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REv. 207 (1986). For an analysis of the prodigious rate of recent tax reform, see 
Doemberg & McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 
MINN. L. REv. 913 (1987). 
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what the law ought to be is rough at best,2 and it is not my intention to 
make overmuch of it. Indeed, discussions within each sphere often 
make use of arguments from the other. Thus, for example, it is com-
mon practice to invoke fairness in an argument for reading the Code 
(or legislative history or administrative pronouncements or case law) 
one way rather than another. Similarly, an argument that something 
constitutes good policy may make persuasive use of the claim that cur-
rent law can be interpreted in a particular way. 
Normative discussions of both sorts sometimes rely on claims 
about the internal coherence of the tax system itself. Arguments for or 
against a particular interpretation or policy frequently are based on 
concerns for the internal coherence or rationality of the system. Pro-
fessor Wayne Barnett's celebrated amicus brief in Commissioner v. 
Tufts 3 provides an instructive example. 
In Tufts the Supreme Court was asked to determine the amount 
realized by a taxpayer who had sold property subject to a nonrecourse 
mortgage whose face value exceeded the fair market value of the prop-
erty. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had 
held that the amount realized was limited to the fair market value of 
the property. The government argued that the amount realized for the 
asset included the full face value of the assumed mortgage. The gov-
ernment's argument was based on the view that the Crane4 rule's in-
clusion of an assumed loan's face value in a seller's amount realized 
and its corresponding inclusion of the amount of a purchase money 
mortgage in an asset's basis should be generalized to apply to the unu-
sual case where the value of the property is less than the outstanding 
amount of the mortgage. 5 The Supreme Court overruled the Fifth 
2. Some might deny even the possibility of such a distinction on the ground that law can be 
read or interpreted to say almost anything the interpreter desires, but that sort of analysis seems 
ill-suited to interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code. 
3. Brieffor Amicus Curiae, Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983) (No. 81-1536). Bar-
nett's position was rejected by the Court but was accorded respect unusual for an amicus brief. 
The majority opinion devotes a footnote to describing his argument and says that, "[a]lthough 
this indeed could be a justifiable mode of analysis, it has not been adopted by the Commissioner." 
Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 310-11 n.11 (1983). Justice O'Connor, concurring, en· 
dorsed Barnett's view in theory, saying, "were we writing on a slate clean except for the decision 
in Crane v. Commissioner. 331 U.S. 1 (1947)," she would take Barnett's approach. Tufts, 461 
U.S. at 317 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Barnett's briefhas also provoked unusual interest among 
commentators. See, e.g., M. GRAETZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 234 (1985); Andrews, On 
Beyond Tufts, 61 TAXES 949 (1983); Lurie, New Ghosts far Old- Crane Footnote 37 ls Dead (Or 
ls It?), 2 AM. J. TAX POLY. 89 (1983). 
4. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947). 
5. Whether the Crane rule should be generalized to apply to this kind of circumstance was 
put into doubt in footnote 37 of the Crane opinion itself. There, in a celebrated piece of dictum, 
the Court wrote: 
Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the amount of the mortgage, a mortgagor 
who is not personally liable cannot realize a benefit equal to the mortgage. Consequently, a 
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Circuit and adopted the government's position. 
Barnett's amicus brief argued that the issue had been miscast by 
the government and that it was a mistake to view the case simply as 
presenting the question of how much the seller had realized for the 
asset upon its sale. Instead, he argued, the transaction should be 
viewed as two dispositions and the "amount-realized" question should 
be asked for each. Thus, the seller is indeed selling the property, but 
he is also disposing of a liability. Each disposition has an associated 
gain or loss. Any gain associated with the asset is capital gain, subject, 
at the time of Tufts (and probably soon again), to a preferential tax 
rate, while any gain associated with relief from the liability is ordinary 
income. The Tufts facts suggest a capital loss on the sale of the asset 
and an ordinary gain as a result of the liability relief. 
Barnett's argument is interesting in part because he maintains that 
the law, properly interpreted, does in fact require the kind of bifurca-
tion he describes and bec8:use he gives as evidence for that claim an 
argument that appeals to the coherence and rationality of the system: 
A rational system for measuring income also requires, however, that all 
receipts and expenditures be accounted for at some time and hence that 
those that are not finally accounted for when they occur be kept in a 
suspense account so that proper account can be taken of them at another 
time. In the case of an asset, the amount that needs to be kept track of 
(the unaccounted-for prior expenditures) has by statute been given a 
name - it is the taxpayer's "basis" for the asset (§ 1012) - and the 
necessity of having such an account is therefore familiar. But there is 
obviously just as much need to keep track of a taxpayer's unaccounted-for 
prior receipts with respect to a liability, and that amount too needs to 
have a name. 6 
Thus, Barnett appeals to the coherence and rationality of the sys-
tem as a justification for his interpretation of the law. Yet, only if one 
assumes that the tax system is in fact consistently coherent and ra-
tional, or if a tax system (or at least our tax system) ought to be coher-
ent and rational, can the requirements of rationality be a reason for 
accepting Barnett's interpretation. The first proposition is clearly 
false. The second is a normative claim and itself requires justification. 
An appeal to internal systemic coherency or rationality does not, by 
itself, provide a reason - sufficient or otherwise - either for inter-
different problem might be encountered where a mortgagor abandoned the property or 
transferred it subject to the mortgage without receiving boot. That is not this case. 
Crane, 331 U.S. at 14, n.37. The first case directly to address the issue was Millar v. Commis-
sioner, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978), which held that the taxpayer's 
gain was not limited by the fair market value of the abandoned property. Millar, 511 F.2d at 
215-16. For a brief, but clear and illuminating, discussion of this part of the background to 
Tufts, see Andrews, supra note 3, at 950-52. 
6. Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 3, at 3-4 (emphasis added). 
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preting the tax law in a particular way or for making a policy judg-
ment. Moreover, any argument for the claim would itself be an 
instance of a normative discussion about what the law should be 
rather than a discussion about how the law as it is should be inter-
preted. As it happens, Barnett neither makes nor acknowledges the 
need for such an argument. 1 
Barnett is not unusual in this respect. Even people who rely on 
claims about systemic coherence or rationality when arguing for a par-
ticular interpretation of tax law or for some tax policy do not directly 
confront the question whether the system should be rational or coher-
ent. Yet given the obvious lack of consistency and coherence among 
the hundreds of provisions in the current Internal Revenue Code and 
the piecemeal character of tax legislative activity, it is an argument 
that must not seem self-evident to those who formulate our tax law. 
To what extent, if any, should internal coherence and rationality be 
goals of an income tax system? 
Having asked the question, this article does not purport to answer 
it. 8 It does, however, try to do some of the work that a serious answer 
would require. To that end, it focuses on the underlying structure on 
which the content of the tax law hangs. By isolating the structure of 
tax systems generally, perhaps we can come to understand and de-
scribe our own system better, and to begin to develop a more useful 
and richer conceptual vocabulary that is independent of concerns 
about the content of the tax base. Only then can we be more self-
conscious about exactly what coherence and rationality in our tax sys-
tem might mean, and about the possible tradeoffs between that value 
and other values that we might want the system to embody. Further, 
we should gain a better understanding of the structure of our argu-
ments about the content of the income tax system. 
I begin, then, with the observation that systemic coherence and 
rationality are not necessary qualities of a tax system. Are there, 
nonetheless, any structural features that must, as a matter of logic, 
underlie any tax system? On examination, there are a few structural 
requirements that are necessarily common to any tax system. In Part 
7. This may be somewhat unfair to Barnett since he only speaks here of rationality and not of 
coherence. If it is rational - as indeed it might be - to talk about its being rational for a tax 
system to be comprised of an incoherent collection of rational parts, then Barnett need only 
argue that the component parts of the tax system ought to be rational. He does not make this 
argument either. Moreover, at another point in his brief he writes, "And that, of course, is just 
as it should and must be: given the treatment of the 'opening' transaction as an independent 
liability-creating transaction, no other treatment of the 'closing' transaction would be coherent." 
Id. at nn.7-8 (emphasis added). 
8. Nor does it argue for or against particular applications or interpretations of current federal 
income·tax law, nor make recommendations about what the content of the tax law ought to be. 
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I of this article I examine those requirements. I show that by isolating 
the necessary structure of a tax system from its particular content or 
goals, we can better understand the role played within the federal sys-
tem of certain of its most characteristic features. In particular, I trace 
the function of the realization requirement for the recognition of in-
come and distinguish it from another sort of function that could lead 
to the recognition of income within an income tax system. This sec-
ond function is a corrective one, and it is achieved in the federal sys-
tem by a mechanism I call "reconciliation." 
Reconciliation has considerable descriptive power within the fed-
eral system. I show this in Part II by examining, as examples, three 
general circumstances that are well described as instances of reconcili-
ation. Two of the three lead to the recognition of income, yet neither 
can be properly described in terms of realization. 9 
Finally, in Part III, I argue that the notion of reconciliation can 
play an important role in normative discussions about the federal in-
come tax system. This role has two parts. First, reconciliation de-
scribes actual phenomena within the federal system with more 
coherence and rationality than traditional vocabulary and concepts al-
low. Those who accept coherence within a tax system as a value will 
attach some value to that description. Second, describing those phe-
nomena in that way implies certain further descriptions of other parts 
of the tax system. Sometimes, however, these further descriptions do 
not fit the law as it actually is, and so the overall coherence of the 
system will turn out to be less than it would have been if the law had 
been otherwise. In such cases, a desire for coherence above all else 
would indicate that the law ought to be changed. However, other, 
sometimes competing, values such as administrability or equity, can be 
relevant to determining whether the law really should be changed. 
When values compete, one will have to choose between particular aims 
on the one hand and the coherence and rationality of the system on 
the other. My purpose here is not to recommend a particular choice 
among these options, but rather to establish that self-conscious articu-
lation and exploration of those values and their importance should be 
a goal of normative discussion about our income tax system. In Part 
9. My interest in this sort of inquiry stems from my observation of our current system's 
inability to account easily for amounts that it includes in taxable income under the rubric of the 
tax benefit rule. The system seemed to struggle unduly to describe in its own terms what seemed 
to be a reasonably plausible, common·sense principle. It appeared to be missing the explicit 
conceptual apparatus that it should have for that task. In an earlier paper I suggested a concep-
tual framework within which the tax benefit rule could be more easily understood and described 
as a feature of the federal income tax system. See White, An Essay on the Conceptual Founda-
tions of the Tax Benefit Rule, 82 MICH. L. RE.v. 486 (1983). 
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III, I illustrate this argument by showing that, in contrast to the usual 
description, reconciliation allows us to describe the tax treatment of 
simple borrowing in a way that is internally consistent and coherent. I 
discuss the implications of this coherent description for the analysis of 
purchase money mortgages and for the central issue in Tufts. Ironi-
cally, although my analysis does suggest the kind of transactional bi-
furcation advocated by Barnett, the requirements of rationality tum 
out to be somewhat different from what he claims, and to come closer 
to the current system than we might expect. There are important re-
spects, however, in which the analysis is not consistent with current 
practice. Instead of arguing that the law ought either to be reformed 
or differently interpreted, I explore one significant administrative cost 
of implementing the analysis and suggest that a full articulation of the 
issue in Tufts would be more complicated than indicated by either 
Barnett or the Supreme Court. 
I. THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF ANY TAX SYSTEM 
Any tax system must make some effort to determine what is poten-
tially taxable. If it is a system that purports to tax income, it need not 
define "income," but it must nonetheless offer some means of identify-
ing th~t which might be taxed.10 Once something has been deemed 
potentially taxable, a system has three possible responses: it can tax 
the item or amount currently, it can tax it later, or it can exempt it 
from taxation.11 
No tax system need employ all three basic responses, much less 
any of their variations. 12 The simplest system would first determine 
10. I use the phrase "potentially taxable amount" rather than the word "income" to desig-
nate that which falls within the purview of a taxing system. This is because all that is logically 
required of the structure of any income tax system, as of any tax system of whatever description, 
is some means of dividing the world into those items that might possibly be taxed and those items 
that could not be. 
11. Actually, there is a fourth general possibility - some combination of the other options 
- but since it is clearly a derivative of the others, I shall not isolate the idea of an allocation 
scheme in the following discussion. 
12. Items that satisfy the threshold criterion (whatever that may be) must be reacted to by 
the system in one of the three basic ways. Those items that do not (and there need not be any of 
them), simply elicit no reaction (although this effect, of course, is equivalent to being excluded). 
A system with a clear definition of "income" might use that definition as the threshold criterion 
for dividing the world. Any system (like the federal income tax system) with no clear definition 
of "income," could employ other criteria to make the division - or it could employ none, and 
make no division at all. A system might well operate with some implicit sense of what should be 
included in "income," and its reactions to the items it considers could be arranged so as to tax 
only those items deemed to be "income." (In fact, the federal income tax system may operate to 
some extent in this last way. In the federal system, taxable income is determined in part by 
deducting from gross income those expenses that it is thought appropriate to net against revenue 
included in gross income. For an interesting criticism of the idea that tax accounting should 
accept this sort of matching as a central principle, see Gunn, Matching of Costs and Revenues as 
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that something is potentially taxable and then immediately tax it. Per-
haps some sort of periodic accounting convention would be instituted 
for administrative ease, but the principal inquiry in such a system 
would be what to tax. 13 The only significant additional complications 
in such a system would involve the quantification and valuation of 
what was to be taxed.14 
A more complicated system might allow either of two reactions to 
the determination that something is potentially taxable: tax it now or 
tax it later. As before, if something were deemed to be within the aegis 
of the tax system it would be taxed, but in this sort of a system the 
timing could vary. Various sorts of criteria might be used to deter-
mine which reaction was appropriate: random choice, alternating re-
actions, or reactions designed to bring about a particular ·state of 
affairs. The many examples of the latter include the desire to maxi-
mize revenue, administrative ease, social welfare, aid or comparative 
advantage to some group or other, and economic parity among tax-
payers. Here the system must answer both the questions what to tax 
and when to tax it. 
A system that admits of the third possible response and reacts to 
the determination that something is potentially taxable by taxing it 
currently, taxing it later, or by not taxing it after all is significantly 
more complex than either of the first two types. The same range of 
criteria is available to guide its choices as in a system with two possible 
reactions, but, because exclusion is now a possibility, everything that is 
potentially taxable need not eventually be taxed. This means that the 
system can use exclusion to tailor its tax base and that the determina-
tion that something is potentially taxable is not necessarily determina-
a Goal of Tax Accounting, 4 VA. TAX REv. 1 (1984). But see Crane, Matching and the Income 
Tax Base: The Special Case of Tax Exempt Income, 5 AM. J. TAX POLY. 191, 204 n.18 (1986).) 
In any event, however, labeling everything that falls within the scope of some income tax system 
"income" for the purpose of the system would be misleading. Moreover, the term itself is so 
fraught with meaning that it seems ill-advised to use it schematically. 
13. A system could answer the question "what is potentially taxable?" in an infinite variety of 
ways. Possible potentially taxable items include: salary, free time, bagels consumed, use of one's 
own winter jacket, and impacted wisdom teeth. Moreover, the what to tax question is inextrica-
bly tied to the question of whom to tax. Thus, the examples might include: a taxpayer's own 
salary, a taxpayer's spouse's free time, bagels consumed by the taxpayer's family, use of any 
jacket by a taxpayer's nephew, and incidents of impacted wisdom teeth on the taxpayer's block 
(or on some block which the taxpayer has never seen). See infra note 39 and accompanying text; 
see also Mcintyre, Implications of US Tax Reform for Distributive Justice, 5 Ausn. TAX F. 219, 
239-40 (1988). 
14. Quantification is a different issue from valuation. It arises because the world is not natu-
rally described in numerical amounts, and a tax system would seem to require some common 
denominator for quantifying whatever is to be taxed. Valuation involves the actual assignment of 
value to whatever is to be taxed. Quantification and valuation issues can both be intractable, and 
I have no intention of minimizing either their importance or their difficulty. 
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tive of what will in fact be taxed. The increased flexibility offered by 
the possibility of exclusion would serve·no purpose if the determina-
tion of what was potentially taxable fully satisfied the normative goals 
for the tax base. As a result, a system that makes use of exclusion in 
addition to deferral must answer an additional question: whether to 
tax that which it has deemed potentially taxable. The what to tax 
question is no longer fully answered by the determination of what is 
potentially taxable; instead, it is only answered as the whether to tax 
question is answered. Indeed, it may only be completely answered af-
ter the timing issues implicit in the when to tax question are fully re-
solved. The federal income tax system is a good example of this 
phenomenon. It does not, although its authors could have allowed it 
to, rely on a definition of "income" (perhaps a Haig-Simons stan-
dard)15 to determine what is potentially taxable and then use current 
taxation, deferral, and exclusion as mechanisms for departing from the 
standard established by the definition. Instead, it uses the responses 
themselves (particularly deduction and exclusion) to achieve some-
thing very loosely approaching a standard for income. 
The crucial observation is that the three possible responses to what 
has been deemed potentially taxable provide a crude model for a tax 
system of whatever degree of complexity. By themselves, they neither 
prescribe nor proscribe any criteria for their application. Nor do they 
entail any requirement that the criteria chosen be applied consist-
ently.16 Thus, whatever treatment an income tax system ultimately 
accords anything it identifies as potentially taxable can be described in 
terms of current taxation, deferral, or exclusion. A system need not 
determine at the point of the item's characterization as potentially tax-
able which of the three treatments it will receive. That decision may 
be deferred, but ultimately the item will either be taxed or excluded.17 
Any criteria could be employed by an income tax system to decide 
whether to tax currently something deemed potentially taxable, to de-
fer its taxation, or to exclude it from taxation. A system could be 
more or less systematic in its selection and articulation of these crite-
ria. Doubtless at some point the taxing mechanism would cease prop-
15. The Haig-Simons definition of income is an ideal much favored by economists. Henry 
Simons' classic statement of the definition: "Personal income may be defined as the algebraic 
sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of 
the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question." H. 
SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938). 
16. Two distinct sorts of consistency might be required. The first is that the criteria treat the 
same item in the same way in identical circumstances, the second is that similar items or circum-
stances be accorded at least similar treatment. A system would seem to require consistency of the 
first sort. It is consistency of the second type that I am referring to in the text. 
17. See infra text accompanying notes 38-60. 
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erly to be called a "system" if the choices about recognition were 
thoroughly ad hoc, but there is an enormous range within which a 
system could operate.18 In the United States and elsewhere there 
might, of course, be constitutional or other legal constraints on the 
content of an income tax system, but such limitations bear on the sys-
tem's legitimacy, not on its status as a system. 19 
A system might well include some means of keeping track of how 
potentially taxable amounts have been treated.20 This would seem 
particularly desirable if the system were designed so as not to tax any 
potentially taxable amount more than once. Income tax systems gen-
erally are characterized by this feature and, indeed, it may usefully 
distinguish an income tax from a wealth tax, a property tax, or a re-
ceipts tax. In the federal income tax, basis is the mechanism used to 
keep track of what has been taxed and what has not been.21 Nonethe-
less, a tracking mechanism is not a necessary feature of a tax system -
even of an income tax system. 
The essential structure of an income tax system, then, requires 
only a mechanism or mechanisms for identifying what is potentially 
taxable and a mechanism or mechanisms for determining whether that 
amount is to be recognized at the point of its identification, to have its 
recognition deferred, or to be given permanent nonrecognition treat-
ment. The system could, of course, provide that all potentially taxable 
amounts are to be treated in the same specific way. In that case, there 
would not be any need for any separate mechanisms to determine 
whether or when to tax them. It is easy to lose sight of this fundamen-
tal structural simplicity when confronting a system as complex as the 
one embodied in the current Internal Revenue Code. Nevertheless, for 
18. For example, a system could provide for the immediate recognition of everything poten-
tially taxable, yet exclude (or permit the deduction of) all (potentially taxable) salary earned by 
an employee of an American automobile manufacturer (or, better yet, by a university professor). 
Or it might provide for a ten-year deferral of the recognition of one third of all potentially taxable 
amounts credited to each taxpayer born on the same day as the Commissioner of the Internal 
Revenue Service (a date that would doubtless vary from Commissioner to Commissioner) and for 
the nontaxation of all potentially taxable amounts attributed to 100,000 (or 1000 or IO) taxpayers 
chosen, freely with no constraints whatever, by the head elephant keeper at the National Zoo. 
19. See generally Bittker & Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: "Constitutionalizing" the In-
ternal Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51 (1972); Norton, The Limitless Federal Taxing Power, 8 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 591 (1985). 
20. I am indebted to Charlotte Crane for forcing me to focus on this point at this point. 
21. I.R.C. § 1012 (1988) defines a property's "basis" as its "cost" to the taxpayer. I.R.C. 
§ 1016 (1988) sets forth rules for adjusting basis upward or downward to reflect additional costs 
incurred by the taxpayer with respect to the property or returns to the taxpayer. of the costs 
previously included. See infra note 101. Adjusted basis is the operative amount wherever the 
Code makes use of basis. William Andrews aptly describes adjusted basis as reflecting "the 
whole history of the tax treatment of an item." Andrews, supra note 3, at 954; see also Crane, 
supra note 12, at 217-23. 
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reasons that I trust will become increasingly clear, it is instructive to 
examine the underlying fundament. 
A. The Role of Realization 
In the federal income tax system, one mechanism used for deter-
mining that a potentially taxable amount will be currently recognized 
is the notion of realization. Articulating the exact content of the con-
cept may well be impossible (if indeed there is a single coherent con-
cept), 22 but its function in the structure of the system is apparent. 
Simply put, our system23 generally regards the realization of a poten-
tially taxable amount as the occasion for its recognition. It does not, 
however, always recognize potentially taxable amounts when they are 
realized.24 Nor, as long as a system has some means of determining 
how to treat potentially taxable amounts, is there any systemic reason 
why realization as intended by the federal system need play any role in 
the recognition/deferred recognition/nonrecognition determination. 
These observations about the general structural requirements of an 
income tax system seem almost too obvious to be worth making. They 
become important, however, because they were so little understood in 
the early evolution of our system. As a consequence, that system be-
came enormously complex without the degree of structural self-con-
sciousness that one might have hoped for. This complexity, in tum, 
obscures both the actual relationships between central features of the 
22. See, e.g., 1 B. BITTKER & L. LoKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, EsTATES AND 
GIFTS § 5.2 (2d ed. 1989); M. CHIREI.SfEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION ~ 5 (5th ed. 1988); 
R. MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME pt. I (rev. ed. 1945). 
23. I emphasize "our" because an income tax system need not rely on or even have a realiza-
tion requirement. 
24. Several Internal Revenue Code provisions defer the taxation of realized amounts. See, 
e.g., I.R.C. § 351 (West Supp. 1990) (exchange of appreciated property for stock or securities of 
equal value in a corporation controlled by the transferor); l.R.C. § 354 (1988) (exchange of ap-
preciated stock or securities in a corporate reorganization); l.R.C. § 721 (1988) (exchange of 
appreciated property for partnership interest); l.R.C. § 1031 (West Supp. 1990) (like-kind ex-
changes of appreciated business or investment property); I.R.C. § 1033 (1988) (involuntary con-
version of appreciated property); l.R.C. § 1034 (1988) (sale of appreciated principal residence 
combined with purchase of new principal residence); l.R.C. § 1035 (1988) (certain exchanges of 
life insurance and annuity contracts); I.R.C. § 1036 (1988) (certain exchanges of stock for stock 
in the same corporation); l.R.C. § 1041 (1988) (transfers of appreciated property between 
spouses or incident to divorce). Elliott Manning observed to me that, as Andrews points out, 
some of these deferral provisions allow us to finesse difficult realization issues by postponing the 
question of whether income has been realized until it is no longer difficult. See Andrews, A 
Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1130-31 (1974). 
Other Code provisions exclude realized amounts from taxation altogether. See, e.g., l.R.C. 
§ 71(c) (1988) (child support payments); § 101 (certain death benefits); § 102 (gifts, inheritances, 
devises); § 103 (interest on certain government obligations); § 104 (certain compensation for per-
sonal injury and sickness); § 112 (certain armed forces combat pay); § 117 (certain scholarships); 
§ 119 (meals or lodging furnished for an employer's convenience); § 121 (gain on sale of principal 
residence by an individual aged 55 or older); § 132 (certain employee fringe benefits). 
June 1990] Foundations of Federal Income Tax 2045 
Code and the fact that there are a few structural requirements. One of 
these requirements is the need for a mechanism or mechanisms 
whereby a system can determine when and whether to tax that which 
it deems potentially taxable. I am not, in this article, going to address 
directly the issues surrounding the choice of what to deem potentially 
taxable, but it is through its response to the determination that some-
thing is potentially taxable that any system prescribes whether and, if 
so, when, the item will be taxed. 
Realization was first articulated by the Supreme Court as a condi-
tion of taxability in 1920 in Eisner v. Macomber. 25 Few transactions 
are as famous as Mrs. Macomber's receipt of a stock dividend from 
Standard Oil, and no one who has borne with me thus far can have 
avoided acquiring more than passing acquaintance with that case.26 It 
is repeatedly cited both as the case that held that the Constitution 
imposed limitations on what could be deemed to constitute income27 
and as the case that actually tried to spell out a definition of "in-
come."28 Both the notion of defining income for tax purposes and the 
notion of grounding that definition in the Constitution now strike us as 
quaint, and the case seems to be preserved largely for its antiquarian 
value.29 I think, however, that its actual legacy is greater than is com-
monly thought. 
25. 252 U.S. 189 (1920). 
26. On January 1, 1916, Standard Oil Corporation issued a 50% stock dividend to Mrs. 
Macomber and the other Standard Oil stockholders as a result of its transfer of an equivalent par 
amount from its surplus account to its capital account. Of this amount, 18.07% represented 
surplus earned between March l, 1913 (the effective date of the sixteenth amendment), and the 
date of distribution. Therefore, when Mrs. Macomber received 1100 shares of the new common 
stock in the distribution, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed income tax on her 
"income" of $19,877, an amount equal to 18.07% of the par value of the total stock she received. 
Mrs. Macomber paid the tax under protest but lost her appeal to the Commissioner. She then 
sued for a refund, contending that the Revenue Act of 1916, which provided that stock dividends 
constituted income taxable under the Act, was unconstitutionally taxing her Standard Oil stock 
dividend as income. 
The Supreme Court agreed and held that the stock dividend was not income within the mean-
ing of the sixteenth amendment because a mere growth of value in a capital investment did not 
constitute income. To be income, the gain had to proceed from capital, be severed from it, and 
be received by Mrs. Macomber for her own separate use or benefit. Since the stock dividend 
represented undistributed corporate earnings, the Court declared that the Revenue Act of 1916 
unconstitutionally required that stock dividends be taxed as income. 
27. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 211. See. e.g., w. ANDREWS, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXA-
TION 123-24 (3d ed. 1985); B. BITIKER & J. EUSTICE, F'uNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL TAXATION 
OF CoRPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 1[ 7.60 (1980 & Supp. 1989); M. GRAETZ, supra note 3, 
at 201. 
28. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 207. See, e.g., W. ANDREWS, supra note 27, at 212; M. CHIREL-
STEIN, supra note 22, at 8-9; M. GRAETZ, supra note 3, at 110. 
29. The Macomber result is encompassed today by§ 305 of the Code. However,§ 305 limits 
the extent to which stock dividends are nontaxable. For example, a stock dividend is fully taxa-
ble if the shareholder can elect whether to receive it either in stock or property. I.R.C. 
§ 305(b)(l) (1988). 
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The task the Court set itself in Macomber was to discover what 
"income" meant in common parlance. The Court interpreted the six-
teenth amendment as using the word in its ordinary sense and thought 
its task was to give "only a clear definition of the term 'income,' as 
that used in common speech, in order to determine its meaning in the 
Amendment."30 This general view had been articulated two years ear-
lier by Learned Hand in United States v. Oregon-Washington Railroad 
and Navigation Co. 31 The meaning of "income" in the sixteenth 
amendment, Hand wrote, is "to be gathered from the implicit assump-
tions of its use in common speech."32 The Macomber Court attempted 
to do so: 
Here we have the essential matter: not a gain accruing to capital, not a 
growth cir increment of value in the investment; but a gain, a profit, some-
thing of exchangeable value proceeding from the property, severed from 
the capital however invested or employed, and coming in, being "de-
rived," that is received or drawn by the recipient (the taxpayer) for his 
separate use, benefit and disposal; - that is income derived from prop-
erty. Nothing else answers the description.33 
Here, the Macomber Court was making not as much a constitutional 
claim as a linguistic one. To be sure, the decision gave constitutional 
status to the requirement that gain from property be realized, but that 
status was presumably derived from the Court's finding about the or-
dinary meaning of "income," rather than the other way around. If the 
ordinary understanding of the word had been different, the content of 
Macomber's constitutional requirement should have differed accord-
ingly. Realization was important to the Court because they viewed it 
as part of what people meant when they spoke about income. Thus, it 
would seem that the content of the concept of realization could, in 
principle at least, evolve as the language evolved. 
Although Eisner v. Macomber has long since ceased to be impor-
tant as a source of a definition of income or as constitutional interpre-
30. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 206-07. The Court noted that economists distinguish between 
"capital" and "income" in various terms, including likening "capital" to a tree or a piece of land 
with the resulting fruit or crop constituting the "income." However, the Court viewed the case 
at hand as requiring only an "ordinary" definition of income. The Court cited as examples of its 
"ordinary" definitional approach two earlier excise tax cases, Stratton's Independence, Ltd. v. 
Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913), and Doyle v. Mitchell Bros., 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918), in 
which the Court had rejected "theoretical" distinctions between capital and income for a deflni· 
tion in its "natural and obvious" sense. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 207. 
The Court relied on this same "common speech" approach in subsequent cases as well. See, 
e.g., Merchants' Loan & Trust v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 519 (1921) (income given its "com-
monly understood meaning," not as defined by "lexicographers or economists"). 
31. 251 F. 211, 212 (2d Cir. 1918). 
32. 251 F. at 212. 
33. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 207. 
June 1990] Foundations of Federal Income Tax 2047 
tation, 34 the sense that realization is intimately tied to the meaning of 
"taxable income" has survived. Although some writers are careful to 
refer to realization as an administrative rule intended to establish the 
time for taxation,35 others write of it, at least implicitly, as a require-
ment of taxability.36 Possibly because the effort to define income for 
purposes of the tax system has been dropped, often no clear line is 
drawn between the part of the phrase "taxable income" that is con-
cerned with what might be taxed (the potentially taxable amounts) and 
the part that is concerned first with whether and then with when it is 
taxed. From the point of view of understanding the structure of an 
income tax system, the difference is crucial. 
As a theoretical matter, of course, unless a requirement of realiza-
tion is built into an income tax system's very conception of taxable 
income, a potentially taxable amount need not be realized to become 
taxable income. 37 It may be, however, that amounts which are poten-
tially taxable within the system must be realized to be taxed. If a sys-
tem conditions taxability on realization (or on anything else for that 
matter), while nonetheless maintaining that the basic notion of poten-
tial taxability is independent of realization (or independent of that 
"anything else"), it necessarily has a concept of taxable income dis-
tinct from its concept of potential taxability. My discussion through-
out reflects this distinction. 
The taxonomy of the relationship in the federal income tax system 
between the determination of a potentially taxable amount and the de-
termination of whether and when to tax it is more complex than ap-
pears at first blush. It begins with the identification of an item as 
within the aegis of the system (that is, as potentially taxable).38 The 
identification can be complicated by questions of whose potentially tax-
34. See, e.g., B. BITIKER & L. LoKKEN, supra note 22, at§ 5.1; M. CHIRELSfEIN, supra note 
22, 11 5.01, at 68-69; M. GRAETZ, supra note 3, at 110, 202. 
35. See, e.g., M. CHIRELSfEIN, supra note 22, 11 5.01, at 68; H. SIMONS, supra note 15, at 
207-08; Andrews, supra note 24, at 1140-48; Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation - Tax Expenditure 
or Proper Allowance for Measuring Net Income?, 78 MICH. L. REv. 1, 7-9 (1979). 
36. See, e.g., B. BARTON, R. CAMPFIELD, et al, Taxation of Income 1988-1989, at 11 2511 
(1988); D. PosIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 146-48 (1983). Perhaps the 
clearest current counterexample to this view can be found in I.R.C. §§ 1271-1275 (1988). These 
provisions set forth the rules for taxing original interest discount, a form of unrealized income. 
37. Even the federal income tax system occasionally taxes unrealized amounts. See, e.g., 
supra note 36; I.R.C. § 1256 (1988) (relating to certain regulated futures contracts, foreign cur-
rency contracts, nonequity options, and dealer equity options). 
38. It is important to notice that the status of being potentially taxable within the federal 
income tax system is not equivalent to any of the categories identified by the Code. The broadest 
category specified by the Code is l.R.C. § 61 (West Supp. 1990) gross income. However, some 
amounts are statutorily excluded from gross income (e.g., l.R.C. § 102 (1988) (amounts received 
as gifts, bequests, inheritances, and devises); see supra note 24 for other examples) and their 
exclusion would be unnecessary if they were not potentially taxable. 
2048 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:2034 
able amount it is39 and questions about the point at which it became 
potentially taxable (a different set of questions from questions about 
whether or when it should be taxed). The initial identification of 
something as potentially taxable very often does happen to coincide 
with the identification of an amount that has been realized by the tax-
payer. In simple terms, something often becomes potentially taxable 
(although maybe not taxable income) in the eyes of the tax system at 
the same time that the taxpayer realizes it in the eyes of the tax sys-
tem. For example, in the federal income tax system, a cash basis tax-
payer's receipt of his paycheck marks both the receipt of a potentially 
taxable amount and its realization. But its status as potentially taxable 
is independent of the fact that it was realized.40 It is clear, moreover, 
that amounts identified as potentially taxable are not always realized 
at the time of their identification. One obvious example in the federal 
income tax system is the so-called unrealized appreciation of an asset. 
Presently the federal system does not tax the appreciation of an asset 
until the taxpayer disposes of it and realizes its increase in value.41 
There seems to be widespread sentiment among tax commentators 
however, that Congress could, if it chose to, tax appreciation cur-
rently. 42 This view reflects the sense that a potentially taxable amount 
need not be realized to become taxable income. 
Once something has been identified within the system as a poten-
tially taxable amount, it becomes relevant to ask whether and when it 
should be taxed; to ask, in other words, whether it should be recog-
nized, have its recognition deferred, or be excluded altogether from 
taxation (receive permanent nonrecognition treatment). These three 
basic responses to a potentially taxable amount are the only ones avail-
able to any income tax system. It is easy to think of examples of each 
39. The question of attribution in the context of ascertaining potential taxability is likely the 
same as the question of attribution in the context of ascertaining actual taxability ("taxable in-
come" in the federal system). This is because once an amount has been identified as potentially 
taxable to X. the response of the system can be to tax it (to X) now, to tax it (to X) later, or to 
exclude it from taxation (to X). If the last option is selected and the amount is instead taxed 
(now or later) to Y, then the amount can be construed as having been reidentified as potentially 
taxable to Y. Indeed, the amount may be taxed to Y even if it is also being taxed to X (and 
perhaps to others as well). This simply means that the same amount has been identified as poten-
tially taxable to more than one taxpayer. In fact, because the federal system does not explicitly 
isolate the question of potential taxability at all, it is difficult to tell in which context an attribu· 
tion question is being asked. 
40. Although here it is the receipt that constitutes the realization, receipt is not a necessary 
condition of realization. 
41. See, e.g., Surrey & McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept: Current Developments and 
Emerging Issues, 20 B.C. L. REv. 225, 228 (1979). 
42. See, e.g., M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 22, 1f 5.01, at 68-9; M. GRAETZ, supra note 3, at 
201; Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 81 HARV. L. REV. 44, 49 (1967); Shakow, 
Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal far Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1986). 
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in the context of the federal income tax. The paycheck received by the 
cash basis taxpayer above probably will be recognized currently,43 the 
compensation put into an Individual Retirement Account by a tax-
payer has its taxation deferred,44 and the amount received by a tax-
payer as a bequest is excluded from his income tax permanently.45 
Although a system that provides for the possibility of exclusion 
can only tax (now or later) or not tax amounts that it deems within its 
scope, it need not make the choice when it identifies those amounts as 
potentially taxable. Of course, if the choice is deferred, taxation at the 
time of identification is no longer an option and any subsequent deci-
sion to tax will have resulted in a deferral of the amount's recognition. 
Our system does exactly this when refusing to recognize the unrealized 
appreciation of an asset. Such appreciation is potentially taxable 
within the system and is not taxed currently, but its ultimate treatment 
is not settled until some later time (often the time the asset is disposed 
of). If, for example, appreciated stock with a basis in the hands of the 
taxpayer of $10 has a fair market value of $50 on March 3, the tax-
payer has a potentially taxable $40 that the system could tax cur-
rently. I!!stead the system does nothing. This leaves open both the 
possibility that the amount will be taxed later and the possibility that 
it will be excluded altogether. If the price of the shares remains at $50 
until April 2, when it drops to $45, and if the taxpayer sells the shares 
on April 2 for $45, he will normally recognize $35. Thus, from the 
perspective of the situation on March 3, he has deferred the recogni-
tion of $35 and excluded $5 altogether. If, instead, the taxpayer were 
to die on April 2, holding the appreciated shares with a fair market 
value of $45, current federal income tax law would exclude both the 
$35 of potentially taxable, but untaxed, appreciation that the taxpayer 
held at his death and the potentially taxable $5 that he had held on 
March 3 but that he no longer held on April 2. 
Other examples are less straightforward. Suppose the stock price 
fluctuates between March 3 and April 2. If the price were $48 on 
March 4, $47 on March 5, $52 on March 6, and $50 from March 7 
until the stock was sold for $50, we cannot simply compare the sale 
price with the price on March 3 and say that, from the perspective of 
the situation on March 3, the taxation of the $40 identified on that 
43. I.R.C. §§ 61(a) and 446 (1988). 
44. A qualified individual may contribute up to a specified amount (currently $2000) to an 
Individual Retirement Account and deduct that amount from her gross income. I.R.C. § 219 
(West Supp. 1990). Any distributions from the I.R.A. will be included in the taxpayer's gross 
income, so the deduction has the effect of deferring taxation on the contributed amount until a 
distribution is made. See I.R.C. § 408 (1988). · 
45. I.R.C. § 102(a) (1988). 
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date as potentially taxable had been deferred. Instead, it would seem 
as if $2 of that amount had been lost on March 4 and another $1 of it 
lost on March 5. Those lost amounts are permanently excluded from 
taxation. Five additional dollars were earned on March 6, and two of 
them were lost (and hence excluded) on March 7. Thus, from the 
perspective of the $40 identified on March 3 as potentially taxable, the 
sale of the stock for $50 should represent the (deferred) recognition of 
$37 and the exclusion of $3. The remaining $3 recognized as taxable 
income was identified as potentially taxable on March 6, along with $2 
that was subsequently excluded.46 
This last example raises a question about the first one. What does 
it mean to say "from the perspective of the situation on March 3"? 
Unless the entire $40 of appreciation present on that date was first 
identifiable on that date, it, no less than the appreciation measured on 
April 2, represents a net figure established over the life of the invest-
ment. In the absence of special circumstances, the choice of March 3 
as a time to measure the unrealized appreciation of the stock is arbi-
trary. At least some of the amount identified on that date as poten-
tially taxable likely could have been identified earlier and traced 
forward to March 3, just as it was traced beyond March 3 in my exam-
ples. The point of the examples is to show that the federal income tax 
system sometimes defers the determination of whether and when to 
tax a potentially taxable amount until some time after it has identified 
the amount as potentially taxable. It is not necessary, for this purpose, 
actually to specify when the identification could first have been made. 
46. The federal income tax system allows some losses to be deducted from a taxpayer's gross 
income. In contexts where losses are fully allowed, the potentially taxable amounts that are 
permanently excluded from taxation because of downward fluctuations in the value of the asset 
would not have been taxed even if they had been recognized. Thus, in the example in the text, 
the $35 gain recognized from the sale of the shares on April 2 for $45 is the same amount that 
would ultimately have been recognized if the shares had been sold and repurchased each time 
that their value had changed and the attendant losses and gains had been recognized. 





March 3 $10 $50 $40 
March 4 $50 $48 (2) 
March 5 $48 $47 (1) 
March 6 $47 $52 5 
March 7 $52 $50 (2) 
April 2 $50 $45 (5) 
Net gain = $35 
The result would not be the same, however, in contexts where losses are not fully allowed. See, 
e.g., I.R.C. § 165(c) (1988) (limitation on losses deductible by an individual to those incurred in a 
trade or business or in a transaction entered into for profit or from casualty or theft); I.R.C. 
§ 267 (1988) (disallowance of losses with respect to transactions between related taxpayers); 
I.R.C. § 1091 (1988) (disallowance of losses from wash sales). 
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It is sufficient that the amount has been identified and that its ultimate 
treatment has not yet been decided. 
If a decision is made not to recognize currently an amount identi-
fied by a tax system as potentially taxable, at least three general types 
of nonrecognition are possible. One is to exclude the amount from 
taxation.47 Within the federal income tax system this result is 
achieved both by provisions cast explicitly as exclusions48 and by pro-
visions cast as deductions.49 It is also achieved preliminarily by the 
realization requirement itself. Since the system normally conditions 
taxation on realization, much that is potentially taxable is excluded 
because it is lost before it is realized. This effect is illustrated by the 
downward fluctuations in the unrealized appreciation of the stock in 
the earlier examples. 50 
A second possible kind of nonrecognition is deferral. A decision 
not to recognize currently a potentially taxable amount could be a de-
cision to defer its recognition until some future date or event. This 
means, of course, that the amount would be recognized, but later. 
Parenthetically, it should be noted that in a pure deferral, the amount 
of the later recognition would be at least the amount identified as po-
tentially taxable at the time of the decision to defer its recognition. To 
the extent that the later recognition were contingent upon the occur-
rence of a subsequent event51 or upon the taxpayer's surviving until 
some later date, 52 "pure deferral" would be something of a misnomer, 
but it is one with which I propose to live for the moment. I am not 
47. This response is possible, of course, only in a system that is sufficiently complex to in-
clude exclusion as a potential reaction. 
48. See supra note 24 for examples. 
49. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 163 (1988) (deduction for certain interest payments); I.R.C. § 164 
(1988) (deduction for certain taxes). 
50. See Grauer, The Supreme Court's Approach to Annual and Transactional Accounting for 
Income Taxes: A Common Law Malfunction in a Statutory System?, 21 GA. L. REv. 329, 393-97 
(1986) (characterizing the realization requirement as an example of transactional accounting). 
51. For example, I.R.C. § 1034 (1988) provides that a taxpayer will recognize current gain 
on the sale of his principal residence only to the extent, if any, that the adjusted sales price 
exceeds the cost of a newly purchased principal residence. The taxpayer's basis in his new resi-
dence is reduced by any nonrecognized gain. This basis adjustment serves to defer recognition of 
the earlier gain until the new residence is sold. The recognition is still contingent, however, on 
the new residence's being sold for more than its adjusted basis, on the taxpayer's not buying yet 
another principal residence for more than the sale price of the second one (thus falling once again 
within the nonrecognition provided by § 1034), and on the taxpayer's not qualifying and electing 
under I.R.C. § 121 (1988) (a one-time exclusion of up to $125,000 of gain on the sale of a princi-
pal residence by a taxpayer age 55 or older) to exclude all or part of the previously deferred gain. 
52. I.R.C. § 1014(a) (1988) provides that a person who inherits property takes it with a basis 
equal to its fair market value at the date of the decedent's death. Because no Code provision 
requires that either the decedent or his estate recognize any difference between the decedent's 
actual basis in the property and its fair market value, any previously deferred gain which was 
reflected in the decedent's basis (under § 1034 for example) will be permanently forgiven. 
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certain in fact that there are any examples of genuinely pure deferral 
within the federal income tax system. 53 
A third general sort of nonrecognition is the result of a decision to 
ignore an event that ordinarily would trigger recognition. A decision 
to ignore in this context is obviously similar to the choice, discussed 
above,54 to defer the decision about whether or when to tax something 
identified as potentially taxable. 
In our current tax system, this phenomenon is illustrated by provi-
sions tying nonrecognition to a carryqver basis. There are many such 
provisions, 55 but a single example should illustrate the point. If tax-
payer A buys a building for $20,000 and its value appreciates to 
$100,000, we call her gain unrealized as long as A continues simply to 
hold the building. If the building is destroyed by fire and A receives 
insurance proceeds of $100,000, she has realized $80,000 gain. The 
federal tax system generally regards the realization of gain as an occa-
sion for the recognition of income. Section 1033 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code allows A to avoid recognition of that gain if she reinvests it 
within a specified time56 in "similar" property.57 If the cost of the 
similar property is $100,000, the replacement property will have the 
same basis as the original property.58 Here the Code appears to in-
dulge in a bit of metaphysical fiction and treats the replacement prop-
erty as if it were the original, undiminished by fire. If that is indeed 
what is happening, then section 1033 is properly characterized as a 
provision that ignores the realization that the receipt of the insurance 
proceeds represented. That moment of realization, under this analy-
sis, cannot be regarded as an occasion for deferral or forgiveness of the 
53. I.R.C. § 1363(d) (1988) may come close to being an example of pure deferral. That 
section requires a corporation that converts from C status to S status to recapture the amount of 
any excess of its inventory valued as of the end of its last tax year as a C corporation using a first· 
in-first-out cost flow assumption, over its last-in-first-out value. The tax is paid in four equal 
installments and its amount is independent of any subsequent value of the inventory. The first 
installment is due on the due date for the S corporation's last return as a C corporation and the 
remaining three are due on the due dates of the S corporation's return for the three succeeding 
years. If the S corporation fails to survive for three years, liability for the uncollected amount 
would presumably pass through to its shareholders under I.R.C. § 1366 (1988). 
54. See supra text accompanying notes 45-47. 
55. See, e.g., l.R.C. § 351 (1988) (exchange of property for stock or securities in corporation 
controlled by transferor); l.R.C. § 354 (1988) (exchange of stock or securities in a corporate 
reorganization); I.R.C. § 721 (1988) (exchange of property for partnership interest); I.R.C. 
§ 1015 (1988) (gifts); I.R.C. § 1031 (1988) Qike-kind exchanges of business or investment prop· 
erty); l.R.C. § 1033 (1988) (involuntary conversions of property); I.R.C. § 1035 (1988) (certain 
exchanges of life insurance and annuity contracts); I.R.C. § 1036 (1988) (certain exchanges of 
stock for stock in same corporation); l.R.C. § 1041 (1988) (transfers of property between spouses 
or incident to divorce). 
56. I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2)(B) (1988). 
57. I.R.C. § 1033(a) (1988). 
58. I.R.C. § 1033(b) (1988). 
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amount realized. Taxation of the realized gain is not being deferred 
because the amount of gain taxed upon the final disposition of the sec-
ond property is a function solely of the difference between the amount 
received for the second property and its basis and is in no way affected 
by the amount of the earlier realization. The gain is not being forgiven 
or permanently excluded because if the value of the replacement prop-
erty persists, the appreciation of the original property will be recog-
nized when the replacement property is disposed of. 59 The provisions 
that are commonly referred to as deferral provisions in the federal in-
come tax system are in fact nonrecognition provisions of this sort. 60 
B. The Role of Reconciliation 
Because a tax system of any complexity will provide for various 
possible treatments of potentially taxable amounts, it makes sense to 
ask whether the choices that the system makes are irrevocable. For 
example, if a system included only the possibilities of immediate recog-
nition (current taxation) and permanent exclusion from taxation, 
could it later include the previously excluded amount or exclude the 
item taxed earlier? The same question arises with respect to the char-
acterization of items. The federal income tax system provides for dif-
fering tax results depending on the characterization of potentially 
taxable amounts as, for example, capital gain, passive income, or ordi-
nary income. Clearly nothing inherent in the structure of an income 
tax system requires either that its particular choices, once made, be 
permanent or that they be susceptible to change. 
A system that opted for revocable choices could incorporate any of 
a number offeatures to facilitate flexibility. For example, it could pro-
vide for reconsideration of earlier choices at pre-set intervals, 61 it 
could institute some form of open-ended transactional accounting as a 
means of aggregating amounts identified as potentially taxable, or it 
could incorporate an amendatory mechanism for correcting earlier re-
sponses that later seemed inappropriate. The most likely motivation 
59. Of course, if the value of the property fluctuates, as in the earlier stock example, see supra 
note 46 and accompanying text, the amount of the realized gain that is lost will thereby have 
been forgiven. 
60. See, e.g .• I.R.C. §§ 721-723 (1988) (exchange of appreciated property for partnership 
interest); l.R.C. § 1031 (1988) Qike-kind exchanges of appreciated property); I.R.C. § 1034 
(1988) (sale of appreciated principal residence combined with purchase of new one); I.R.C. 
§ 1035 (1988) (certain exchanges of life insurance and annuity contracts); I.R.C. § 1036 (1988) 
(certain exchanges of stock for stock in the same corporation); I.R.C. § 1037 (1988) (certain 
exchanges of U.S. obligations); l.R.C. § 1041 (1988) (transfers of appreciated property between 
spouses or incident to divorce). 
61. It probably could not allow for criterion-less reconsideration at will and still remain a 
system. 
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for making the responses of a system revocable would seem to be the 
desire to prevent mistakes within the system from becoming perma-
nent. It is important to note, however, that any such device is a mech-
anism whereby a system can determine whether and when to tax that 
which it deems potentially taxable and, to that extent at least, plays a 
role not unlike that played by realization in the federal income tax 
system. 
Two general sorts of corrective devices are available to any tax 
system. The simplest way to correct a mistake is simply to undo it. 
Life seldom affords us that opportunity, but a tax system might come 
close. If, for example, a taxpayer within an income tax system in-
cludes in taxable income something that the system, its rules correctly 
applied, treats as excludable, the system could allow him to go back 
and recalculate his taxable income after he discovers his mistake. It 
could allow him to make whatever future adjustments are necessary to 
put him in precisely the position he would have been in had he initially 
made an accurate calculation. The federal income tax system provides 
for something like this kind of "return amendment" within three years 
of the filing date of the original tax return. 62 
On the other hand, some kinds of mistakes cannot be undone. 
Sometimes we make decisions that turn out to be mistaken because 
things did not turn out as we reasonably had expected them to. I de-
cide to drive to work and not to walk because I am in a hurry. I arrive 
at my office much later than I would have had I walked, because I was 
involved in an automobile accident on the way. Or I decide to go to 
Kauai for my vacation, and it is unexpectedly devastated by a typhoon 
while I am there. In cases like these, it would not be enough to be 
given the opportunity to return to the original point of decision. The 
decisions themselves were entirely reasonable when they were made. 
Only unforeseeable subsequent events cause these choices to be 
mistakes. 
Analogous errors can be made in the context of a tax system. As-
sume, for example, an income tax system that allows the exclusion 
(through a deduction) of all potentially taxable amounts spent on food 
consumed by the taxpayer. Assume, too, that the system requires tax-
payers to calculate and report their taxable income on a monthly basis 
and that it requires them to deduct money spent on food in the period 
62. I.R.C. § 651 l(a) (1988) allows a taxpayer to file an amended return which claims either a 
credit or a refund within the later of three years from the time the original return was filed or two 
years from the time the tax was paid. The amount of any credit or refund is limited to the tax 
paid within the applicable period plus interest. I.R.C. § 65ll(b)(2) (1988); I.R.C. § 661l(a) 
(1988). 
June 1990] Foundations of Federal Income Tax 2055 
in which it is spent, even if the food will be consumed later. If a tax-
payer in this system spent $100 in May on meat that she planned to 
eat in June but did not eat because she discovered in June that the 
meat was tainted, two mistakes would have occurred. First, it was 
obviously a mistake for the taxpayer to have spent $100 on tainted 
meat, but second, her deduction of the $100 in May has turned out to 
have been a mistake too. If the taxpayer could have known when she 
bought the meat that it was spoiled or that it would spoil before she 
would eat it, then she likely would not have taken the May deduc-
tion. 63 This mistake, at least, would be amenable to the kind of cor-
rective measure provided by return amendment. If, however, the 
taxpayer could not have known in May about the taint (perhaps be-
cause it came about as a result of a power outage in June), then her 
second mistake is analogous to my mistaken decisions to drive to work 
and to vacation on Kauai. Return amendment would not be an appro-
priate antidote because the mistake did not lie in the return. The re-
turn only became an inaccurate account of the taxpayer's income 
because of what happened in June.64 But the May return did nonethe-
less present an incorrect picture of what happened in May since the 
taxpayer did not in fact spend $100 for meat that she eventually 
consumed. 
Mistakes of this sort are possible in any tax system that both is 
capable of giving more than one possible response to amounts identi-
fied as potentially taxable and requires periodic accounting. 65 A sys-
tem could simply accept such mistakes as a cost of the enormous 
63. Assume that no deduction is allowed in this system for the tainted meat. 
I cannot forbear noting here, in anticipation of the discussion (see infra text accompanying 
notes 77-97) of the tax benefit rule, that there is a curious difference between the scienter require-
ment of provisions, like the hypothetical one in the example and, more importantly, like I.R.C. 
§ 162 (West Supp. 1990) (business expense deduction), which condition deductibility on the in-
tended and predicted use of the purchased item, and provisions, like I.R.C. § 164(a)(3) (West 
Supp. 1990) which provides for the deductibility of state income taxes paid, which condition 
deductibility simply on whether the expense was in fact incurred or accrued (as the case may be) 
regardless of the taxpayer's knowledge that he will later receive a refund of the expenditure. 
64. See, e.g., Stradlings Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 84 (1981), for a good 
example of exactly this sort of inaccuracy. In Stradlings the taxpayer deducted prepaid intangi-
ble drilling expenses pursuant to a binding contract with a company called Thor. In a subse-
quent year Thor breached the contract by not drilling. The Tax Court upheld the original 
deduction: 
The determination and payment of income taxes is based on annual accounting periods. 
This determination is based on the facts as they exist with respect to the particular year 
involved .•.. We do not see how respondent [the IRS] could have expected petitioner to 
foresee that Thor would breach his contractual commitment subsequent to June 30, 1973, 
the end of petitioner's 1973 fiscal year. 
76 T.C. at 89-90. 
65. Such mistakes might also arise where there has been transactional accounting if a trans-
action that was apparently closed (and had therefore been accounted for within the tax system) 
later reopened. 
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administrative benefits that come from periodic accounting. Consis-
tent with this position, it would include no corrective devices designed 
to address this kind of mistake. The taxpayer who bought the meat in 
May would be allowed her deduction, and the fact that it spoiled in 
June would have no tax consequences for her. But a system might 
utilize a second general sort of corrective device. It is to that device 
that I now turn. 
If a mistake cannot be undone effectively (either because of the 
nature of the mistake or because the system does not include a correc-
tive mechanism of the first sort), it might still be mitigated by making 
an adjustment to the current period's accounting. 66 Consider, once 
again, the example of the tainted meat. The income tax system could 
respond to the fact that the meat is disposed of in June without being 
consumed by the taxpayer by adding some amount to June's reported 
income. I say "some amount" because the determination of the mea-
sure of the corrective adjustment in a case like the example raises a set 
of issues of its own. Put these aside briefly and focus instead on the 
nature of the adjustment. It is an adjustment that seeks to reconcile 
the present67 with the past to make them compatible. Clearly such 
adjustments have considerably greater feasibility within the quantifi-
able context of a tax system than they do within most of the nonquan-
tifiable contexts in which mistakes occur. But, to return to my hurried 
drive to work and my vacation in Kauai, it is as if I could see these 
calamities through somewhat rose-colored glasses - it was not bad, 
after all (and unpredictably), that I did not arrive at the office when I 
would have, had all gone as expected, and I am not unhappy that I got 
to experience a typhoon at close range on my vacation. 
The second general sort of corrective device available to a tax sys-
tem, then, is reconciliation. 68 The federal income tax system makes 
enormous use of this mechanism, 69 both by itself and in combination 
with return amendment. Although the applications of reconciliation 
66. There are three other logical possibilities. The adjustment could be made to a future 
period's accounting, made to some other past period's accounting, or allocated in some way 
between the accounting of multiple periods. Nothing said in this article about adjusting the 
current period's accounting is inconsistent with the possibility of adjusting a past or future pe· 
riod's accounting instead or as well. None of these other sorts of adjustment would be as concep· 
tually satisfying and none is much relied on by the federal income tax system. But see I.R.C. 
§ 651 l(d)(2) (1988) (establishing a period oflimitation and procedures for adjusting for overpay-
ments attributable to net operating loss carrybacks or capital loss carrybacks). 
67. Or the future, if.the adjustment were to a future accounting period. 
68. See White, supra note 9. 
69. Though not in Stradlings Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 84 (1981), dis· 
cussed supra note 64, because the only year at issue was the year in which the deduction had been 
taken. 
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are familiar, they are seldom all viewed as instances of the same phe-
nomenon. Nor is there any sense of the role of that phenomenon in 
the overall structure of the system. 
II. THE DESCRIPTIVE POWER OF RECONCILIATION 
Reconciliation itself is not, of course, a necessary feature of a tax 
system. A system might not provide for the sort of correction afforded 
by reconciliation. But a system might in fact allow for the possibility 
of nonamendatory revocability, and, if the foregoing account is cor-
rect, any such change will be an instance of reconciliation whether or 
not it is so described. Thus, I do not argue that each of the following 
examples of the operation of reconciliation within the federal income 
tax system is widely perceived as such.70 None of them is. Indeed, as 
far as I know, "reconciliation" ih this context is my own term. 71 In-
stead, I am interested in exposing the structural framework that must 
underlie any tax system and hence any income tax system. Once the 
necessary features of the structure are understood, we can begin to 
give a, much richer description of the details of our particular system. 
A. The Claim of Right l)octrine 
Perhaps the easiest context within the federal income ·system in 
which to see reconciliation operating as a corrective device is the so-
called claim of right doctrine. Sometimes a taxpayer, in good faith, 
includes an amount in the taxable income of one year only to discover 
in a later year that the amount did not properly belong to him and 
must be returned. Sometimes a taxpayer claims in one year that he is 
entitled to an amount even though his claim is being disputed and in a 
later year may be resolved against him. Broadly stated, the claim of 
right doctrine requires a taxpayer to include in his or its taxable in-
come any amount otherwise currently taxable and acquired or held 
under a claim of entitlement.72 Thus, in both circumstances, the tax-
70. Nor do I claim that any of these examples currently represents a fully consistent applica-
tion of reconciliation. Still less do I wish to argue that good tax policy necessarily requires a 
consistent application of this (or any other) principle. 
71. White, supra note 9, at 496. The term seems now to have been adopted in the context of 
the tax benefit rule by Chirelstein as well. M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 22, ff 10.03, at 217. 
72. The claim of right doctrine has its genesis in North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 
286 U.S. 417 (1932). A dispute arose between North American and the U.S. government con-
cerning profits earned in 1916 from certain government-owned oil properties, from which the 
government was seeking to oust the company. The disputed profits were placed in the hands of a 
receiver appointed to operate the property and hold the income until the dispute was resolved. 
In 1917, the government's case was dismissed, and the receiver paid the money to North Ameri-
can. Meanwhile, the government pursued appeals without success until 1922. North American 
reported the income for the tax year 1916 through an amended return filed in 1918. The Com-
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payer correctly includes the amount in the earlier year's taxable in-
come but, as a result, may fail to meet the system's standards of 
accuracy for measurement of that year's taxable income. The tax sys-
tem could, of course, make no effort to respond to the inaccuracy. Or 
it could require the taxpayer to amend its original return in the light of 
later events. In this context, the federal income tax system has devel-
oped a different response - it adjusts the current Oater) year's taxable 
income.73 The current situation, i.e., the one in which the earlier in-
cluded amount has been relinquished, is reconciled with the earlier 
one. 
The notion of transcending strict adherence to annual accounting 
to reconcile the present with the past does not necessarily require that 
the reconciliation be complete. Thus, the amount of the corrective 
missioner assessed a deficiency for North American's failure to report the income for 1917, the 
year the company actually received the income, rather than for 1916. 
The Court held that the disputed profits became income to the company in 1917, when it first 
became entitled to them and when it actually received them, regardless of whether the company's 
return was filed on a cash or accrual basis. 
If a taxpayer receives earnings under a claim of right and without restriction as to its 
disposition, he has received income which he is required to return, even though it may still 
be claimed that he is not entitled to retain the money, and even though he may still be 
adjudged liable to restore its equivalent. 
286 U.S. at 424. 
The Court rejected North American's claim that the income was reportable in 1916, either by 
North American or by the receiver, who held the profits. The income was not taxable to the 
receiver because he was the receiver of only a part of the properties operated by the company 
and, therefore, was not required to file a return. The amount was not income to North American 
in 1916, because the company was not required to report as income an amount that it might 
never receive. Consistently with the position it had taken, the Court similarly rejected North 
American's alternative claim that the income was reportable in 1922 when the Government's last 
appeal failed and the dispute was finally resolved. The Court, however, did say, in dicta, that if 
the Government had prevailed in the final appeal, North American would have been entitled to a 
deduction from its 1922 income, since it would have paid the money to the Government in that 
year. This approach was subsequently adopted by the federal income tax system. See infra note 
73. 
The claim of right doctrine has been applied to require inclusion in income during the tax 
year in which the payment was received even if the payments were based on erroneous computa-
tions or were obtained illegally. The fact that the taxpayer might have to relinquish the money to 
a superior claimant in later years does not affect the income's taxability in a tax year when the 
taxpayer has unrestricted use of the income. See, e.g., James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 
(1961) (embezzled monies income to embezzler regardless of duty to repay); United States v. 
Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951) (compensation based on erroneously computed employer's profits 
includable in income under claim of right rule although later repayment of erroneous amount 
required). See generally B. BITTKER & L. LoKKEN, supra note 22, at ~ 6.3; Lister, The Use and 
Abuse of Pragmatism: The Judicial Doctrine of Claim of Right, 21 TAX L. REV. 263 (1966). 
73. This approach consists of two components, one of judicial origin and the other statutory. 
The judicially created aspect provides for deduction from gross income in the tax year in which 
repayment is made, rather than for amendment of the prior year's tax return. This result was 
suggested in dicta in North American, 286 U.S. at 424. See supra note 72. However, United 
States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951), is the case in which the Supreme Court first actually applied 
this approach. • 
The statutory component of this approach is embodied in I.R.C. § 1341 (1988). That section 
provides for the special computation of the tax due from a taxpayer who is deducting the restora-
tion of an amount previously included in income under a claim of right. 
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adjustment is not dictated by the fact of the use of reconciliation. Two 
methods of measuring that amount have figured in the development of 
the claim of right doctrine. In United States v. Lewis, 74 the Supreme 
Court :lield that a taxpayer who had received a cash bonus in 1944, 
reported the amount as income on his 1944 return, was later notified 
that the bonus was greater than it should have been, and repaid half of 
the amount in 1946, could not reopen his 1944 return to reflect what 
had happened in 1946 but must instead be content to deduct the re-
payment amount in 1946. The taxpayer in Lewis had a higher effective 
tax rate in 1944 than he had in 1946, and so the deduction in 1946 did 
not fully correct for the tax overpayment of 1944. If his tax rate for 
1946 had been higher than his rate for 1944, he would have been better 
off taking the deduction in 1946 than amending his 1944 return, but 
reconciliation would still have been an imperfect corrective device be-
cause it would have overcorrected for the earlier inclusion. 
In 1954, Congress reacted to the Lewis side of this imbalance with 
section 1341 of the Code.75 That provision allows a taxpayer in Lewis' 
situation to choose, instead of taking a deduction in the year of repay-
ment, to lower his tax bill for the repayment year by an amount equai 
to the tax that would have been saved in the earlier year had the 
amount later repaid not been included in the first place.76 Although 
74. 340 U.S. 590 (1951). 
15. It seems clear that l.R.C. § 1341 (1988) was enacted solely to cure the unfair situation 
present in Lewis. The House Report on § 1341 contains the following reference to the case: 
If the taxpayer included an item in gross income in one taxable year, and in a subsequent 
taxable year he becomes entitled to a deduction because the item or a portion thereof is no 
longer subject to his unrestricted use, and the amount of the deduction is in excess of $3,000, 
the tax for the subsequent year is reduced by either the tax attributable to the deduction or 
the decrease in the tax for the prior year attributable to the removal of the item, whichever is 
greater. Under the rule of the Lewis case, the taxpayer is entitled to a deduction only in the 
year of repayment. 
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A294, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CooE CoNG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS 4017, 4436 (citation omitted); see also S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 451, re-
printed in 1954 U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4621, 5095; H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 2543, 83d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 72, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5280, 5333. 
76. The provisions of I.R.C. § 1341 (1988) are applicable to a cash basis taxpayer in the tax 
year "in which the item of income included in a prior year under a claim of right is actually 
repaid" or in the year or years that the taxpayer relinquished his right to receive the income if the 
income was only constructively received in the prior year. Treas. Reg.§ 1.1341-l(e) (as amended 
in 1978). For an accrual method taxpayer, § 1341 applies "to the year in which the obligation 
properly accrue[d] for the repayment of the item included under a claim of right." Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.1341-l(e) (as amended 1978). 
"Income included under a claim of right" means an item included in gross income because it 
appeared from the facts available in the year that the amount was included in gross income, that 
the taxpayer had an "unrestricted right" to the income. Treas. Reg.§ 1.1341-l(a) (as amended 
in 1978). The deductible amount is considered "restored" for§ 1341 purposes if its repayment 
results because it is established after the close of the prior tax year that the taxpayer did not have 
an unrestricted right to the income, as he had earlier believed. Treas. Reg. § 1.1341-l(a) (as 
amended in 1978). 
There are certain limitations and exceptions to§ 1341. For example, the section applies only 
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this provision clearly protects taxpayers from suffering poor Lewis' 
fate, it does not provide a perfect corrective either. Under section 
1341, a taxpayer will not recover the costs to him (if any) associated 
with having actually paid the tax in the earlier year. Nor does section 
1341 prevent the overcorrection that occurs when the effective tax rate 
in the year of deduction is higher than that for the earlier year of 
inclusion. 
B. The Tax Benefit Rule 
A tax system might also include some mechanism by which to cor-
rect the mistakes that result from deductions or exclusions that were 
properly taken in one year but turn out in a later year, usually (but not 
necessarily) because of the recovery of some (or all) of the amount 
deducted or excluded, not to reflect what the system deems to be the 
taxpayer's appropriately taxable amount. Here too, the federal income 
tax system reconciles the later and earlier situations. The general 
name given to our system's response to this kind of circumstance is the 
"tax benefit rule." Roughly speaking, the tax benefit rule applies to 
include the reclaimed amount in the later year's taxable income to the 
extent that the earlier deduction or exclusion resulted in an actual tax 
benefit.77 Despite its obvious mirror-image-like relationship to what 
today passes as the claim of right doctrine, the tax benefit rule 
originated quite independently of its "converse." It has been an ac-
knowledged feature of the federal income tax system since 1927, when 
the Board of Tax Appeals upheld the Commissioner's claim that a 
taxpayer who collected on accounts that had been listed on an earlier 
year's return as deductible worthless accounts, had to include the 
amount of the collections in income for the year of collection. 78 As 
if the amount of income repayable (because the taxpayer does not have an unrestricted right to it) 
exceeds $3000. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(3) (1988). Section 1341 does not generally apply to repayments 
of amounts initially included in gross income by reason of the sale or other disposition of inven-
tory by the taxpayer, such as sales returns and allowances. I.R.C. § 1341(b)(2) (1988); Treas. 
Reg. § 1.1341-l(f)(l) (as amended in 1978). In addition, the regulations provide that § 1341 
does not apply to deductions attributable to bad debts or legal fees and expenses incurred by the 
taxpayer in contesting the restoration of an item previously included in income. Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.1341-l(g), (h) (as amended in 1978). Further, § 1341(b)(4) and (5) provide special rules re· 
garding the treatment of net operating losses and capital losses. 
77. For an extended discussion of the tax benefit rule, see White, supra note 9; see also M. 
CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 22, at ~ 10.03. 
The tax benefit rule has two aspects. The "inclusionary" component requires the inclusion in 
income of an amount equal to the amount deducted in an earlier year. The "exclusionary" com-
ponent conditions inclusion on there having been a tax benefit as the result of the earlier deduc-
tion. The exclusionary aspect is currently set forth in I.R.C. § 111 (1988). 
78. Lee v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 541 (1927), affd. sub nom. Carr v. Commissioner, 28 F.2d 
551 (5th Cir. 1928); see also Excelsior Printing Co. v. Commissioner, 16 B.T.A. 886 (1929) (re· 
covery of debt earlier charged off as worthless held to be taxable income for year of recovery), In 
these early cases the principle was limited to its inclusionary aspect and was not typically given a 
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with any essentially nonstatutory rule, the contours of the tax benefit 
principle within the federal income tax system have evolved over time. 
Most recently, the Supreme Court, in Hillsboro National Bank v. Com-
missioner, 79 dealt squarely, and at some length, with the tax benefit 
rule.80 
The conventional description of what is happening when the tax 
benefit rule is applied to require inclusion of the amount of an earlier 
deduction in a taxpayer's income for a later years1 is straightforward. 
It is couched in terms of basis and realization. The item whose cost 
was deducted82 has a basis in the taxpayer's hands equal to its after-tax 
name. The exclusionary component first surfaced in 1932 when it was rejected by the Board of 
Tax Appeals. Lake View Trust & Sav. Bank v. Commissioner, 27 B.~.A. 290 (1932). Congress 
codified the exclusionary aspect in 1942. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 116, 56 Stat. 798, 812-
13 (1942) (current version at I.R.C. § 111 (1988)). The phrase "tax benefit rule" was used by the 
Board of Tax Appeals by 1942 primarily, if not exclusively, to refer to the rule's exclusionary 
component. See Haughey v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 1, 4 (1942). Legal commentators from 
the same period varied in their use of the phrase. See, e.g., Lassen, The Tax Benefit Rule and 
Related Problems, 20 TAXES 473, 473 (1942) (applies "tax benefit rule" to both components); 
Plumb, The Tax Benefit Rule Today, 57 HARV. L. REv. 129, 130.31 (1943) (refers to inclusion-
ary aspect as a "general rule" without naming it). Current use of the phrase encompasses both 
the inclusionary and exclusionary components. 
For further background on the history of the tax benefit rule, see generally Bittker & Kanner, 
The Tax Benefit Rule, 26 UCLA L. REv. 265 (1978); Note, The Tax Benefit Rule, Claim of 
Right Restorations, and Annual Accounting: A Cure for the Inconsistencies, 21 V AND. L. REv. 
995, 999-1010 (1968). 
79. 460 U.S. 370 (1983). 
80. Hillsboro was a consolidation of two cases presenting rather different fact situations. In 
Hillsboro, Hillsboro National Bank paid a state property tax on behalf of its shareholders in 
1972. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 373. Because the validity of the tax was under question, the state 
placed the collected amounts in escrow. Hillsbdro, 460 U.S. at 373. When the tax ultimately was 
declared invalid, the state paid the amounts collected from the bank directly to the shareltolders 
on whom the tax had been imposed. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 374. The Bank deducted its payment 
of the tax under § 164(e), which allowed a corporate deduction for shareholder taxes paid by a 
corporation, and it neither made any adjustment nor reported any income when the tax refund 
was made to the shareholders by the state. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 373-74. The Commissioner 
sought to use the tax benefit rule to include the amount of the refund in the bank's income. 
Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 374. The bank argued that since it had not recovered the amount, the tax 
benefit rule did not apply. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 381. 
The second case was originally known as United States v. Bliss Dairy, Inc. See infra text 
accompanying notes 87-91 for a summary of the facts. 
The Court rejected the view that economic recovery is required before the tax benefit rule can 
apply. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 381-83. It went on to hold that when a later event is "fundamen-
tally inconsistent with the premise on which the deduction was initially based," the tax benefit 
rule applies. 460 U.S. at 383. As articulated by the Court, the test is whether the later event 
would have foreclosed the deduction if the two had occurred within the same taxable year. 460 
U.S. at 383-84. Curiously, despite its articulation of the tax benefit rule, the Court did not frame 
its consideration of whether the tax benefit rule actually applied to Hillsboro National Bank or 
Bliss Dairy, Inc. in terms of fundamental inconsistency. It held that the rule did not apply to the 
bank because of the legislative history of§ 164(e) and that it did apply to the Dairy. See White, 
supra note 9, at 499-500. 
81. One example would be the inclusion of a taxpayer's state income tax refund in her federal 
taxable income for the year received if she deducted it from her federal taxable income when she 
paid the state tax in an earlier year. 
82. The "item" in the example in note 81 supra is the state income tax paid. 
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cost - zero if the entire cost was deducted. Thus, when the item is 
recovered by the taxpayer, the amount realized is offset against its ba-
sis in the taxpayer's hands and the difference is treated as a realized 
gain.83 
The conventional account, while adequate for many descriptive 
purposes, does not capture a significant subset of the circumstances in 
which the tax benefit rule has been applied. Nor, more importantly, 
does it explain the role that the tax benefit rule has within the struc-
ture of the federal income tax system. A couple of examples can illus-
trate the first problem. The second will itself require a bit of 
explanation. 
The statutory portion of the tax benefit rule is set forth as section 
111 of the Internal Revenue Code. That provision currently excludes 
from income any recovered amounts that did not produce a tax benefit 
when they were deducted in an earlier year.84 It represents the statu-
tory expression of what has long been known as .the exclusionary as-
pect of the nonstatutorily developed tax benefit rule. 85 The adjusted 
basis of any item that was expensed in the earlier year will be zero, 
however, even if the deduction did not in fact yield a tax benefit. The 
limitation on the inclusion of the recovered amount to the actual 
amount of the earlier tax benefit is not simply the result of offsetting 
the amount of the recovery against the basis. 
Another, quite different, sort of example of the failure of what I 
have called the "conventional account" to describe some core applica-
tions of the tax benefit rule is the Supreme Court's opinion in Hills-
boro. 86 Hillsboro was the name under which two cases were 
consolidated. My point is best illustrated by the facts of the case origi-
nally known as United States v. Bliss Dairy, Inc. 87 Bliss Dairy, Inc. 
bought cattle feed for use in its business operations and deducted the 
full cost of the feed in the same year. 88 Two days into the next taxable 
year, the company liquidated under section 336. 89 The assets distrib-
83. See, e.g., M. CHIREISTEIN, supra note 22, at 11 10.03. 
84. I.R.C. § lll(a) (1988) currently provides: "Gross income does not include income at-
tributable to the recovery during the taxable year of any amount deducted in any prior taxable 
year to the extent such amount did not reduce the amount of tax imposed by this chapter." 
85. See supra note 77. 
86. 460 U.S. 370 (1983). 
87. See supra note 80 for a description of the facts of the case originally known as Hillsboro 
Natl Bank v. Commissioner. 
88. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 374. 
89. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 374. At the time that Bliss liquidated, I.R.C. § 336(a) (1982) pro-
vided in pertinent part that "no gain or loss shall be recognized to a corporation on the distribu-
tion of property in complete liquidation." That section was substantially changed by the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 to make nonrecognition the exception rather than the rule. 
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uted to its shareholders by Bliss in liquidation included unused, 
though previously expensed, cattle feed.90 Bliss did not include the 
value of the unused cattle feed in its income for the second year on the 
ground that the tax benefit rule required an actual recovery of a previ-
ous tax benefit.91 The Supreme Court applied the tax benefit rule to 
Bliss Dairy saying, "[t]he purpose of the rule is not simply to tax 're-
coveries.' "92 Instead, the rule "ordinarily applies to require the inclu-
sion of income when events occur that are fundamentally inconsistent 
with an earlier deduction."93 The Court has been much criticized for 
its failure fully to spell out when a later event is "fundamentally incon-
sistent" with an earlier deduction. 94 Instead, the Court left both the 
content of the notion and the conditions of its application somewhat 
vague. The emphasis throughout the opinion however is on the rela-
tionship between the later year's circumstances and the prior year's 
report of taxable income. The Court makes no explicit effort to specify 
precisely the conditions that trigger the comparison, much less to tie 
the rule's application to the current realization of some amount. Thus, 
although the amount included in taxable income under the tax benefit 
rule may well equal the difference between a current valuation and a 
previously established basis,95 it is at least unhelpful to describe the 
rule solely in terms of an amount realized against which the adjusted 
basis is offset. 
As a general matter, a tax system could build the possibility of 
understatement into its operating rules by allowing taxpayers to de-
duct or exclude amounts on the assumption (tacit or explicit) that cer-
tain future events would or would not occur. So long as the future is 
contingent, such a system includes the possibility that the taxpayer has 
understated his taxable income - at least that she would have stated 
it differently had she known then what she knows now. She has made 
a mistake akin to the ones I made when I took my vacation trip to 
Kauai or drove to my office. A system with this feature might or 
might not include a mechanism or mechanisms to correct the mistakes 
90. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 374. 
91. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 381; Brief for the Respondent Bliss Dairy, Inc. at 5, Hillsboro (No. 
81-930). 
92. 460 U.S. at 381. 
93. 460 U.S. at 372. 
94. See, e.g., 460 U.S. at 417-18 (Stevens, J., concurring in Hillsboro and dissenting in Bliss); 
Blum, The Role of the Supreme Court in Federal Tax Controversies - Hillsboro National Bank 
and Bliss Dairy, Inc., 61 TAXES 363, 366-67 (1983); White, supra note 9, at 495-99; Comment, 
An Asset-Based Approach to the Tax Benefit Rule, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1257, 1270-78 (1984). 
95. But see the example discussed supra text accompanying note 86. 
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it will inevitably breed. The federal income tax system does. The tax 
benefit rule is an example of one such mechanism. 
The principal role of the tax benefit rule within the federal income 
tax system is corrective. It serves as an exception to the administrative 
requirement of annual accounting when annual accounting distorts a 
taxpayer's taxable income in a manner favorable to the taxpayer. Ob-
viously, it does not apply in all instances where a taxpayer's income 
for some year has been understated,96 but it only applies in instances 
where that has happened. Moreover, as Hillsboro tells us, the tax ben-
efit rule only applies when the understatement occurs because a later 
year's events are "fundamentally inconsistent" with the picture of the 
future upon which the original deduction (or deductions) was pre-
mised. The rule applies to reconcile the past prediction of the future 
with the actual outcome. This is the principal function of the tax ben-
efit rule, and it is this central feature that the "conventional" descrip-
tion of the rule fails to capture. 
Finally, it should be noted that the notion of an understatement or 
distortion of a taxpayer's taxable income is a relative one. In this dis-
cussion, I am giving a schematic account of the structure of any tax 
system, and I began with a set of observations that emphasized the 
independence of the determination of what constitutes a potentially 
taxable amount within a system from the determination of whether 
and when to tax it. Although, for example, a system could certainly 
seek to employ a notion of potentially taxable amount identical to the 
economists' sense of income (whatever that sense is) and could further 
attempt to structure its taxing mechanisms so as to tax all amounts 
thus construed as soon as they became the taxpayer's, there is no nec-
essary identity between a taxpayer's taxable income for any year and 
his income in the economist's sense for the same year.97 Further, since 
a system could adopt any notion of potentially taxable amount and 
any standards for determining whether and when to tax it, an under-
statement of taxable income can only result within a system's own 
framework. 
C. Recapture Provisions 
My third example of reconciliation operating within the federal in-
come tax system is, in a way, a variant of the tax benefit rule. The 
Internal Revenue Code includes a number of recapture provisions 
96. In some circumstances return amendment is the appropriate antidote, in others the stat-
ute of limitations (normally three years after a tax return is filed; see I.R.C. § 6501(a) (1988)) 
operates to allow a taxpayer to ignore the earlier understatement. 
97. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19. 
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whereby an amount is included in a later year as an adjustment for a 
deduction or credit taken in an earlier year.98 Section 1245 histori-
cally has been the most important99 of these provisions, and, although 
its current importance has been much reduced by the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986,t00 it illustrates reconciliation well. Another reason for using 
section 1245 as illustrative of recapture provisions generally is that its 
intimate connection with depreciation invites a look at depreciation, 
which itself illuminates the nature of reconciliation. 
When an asset is depreciated for tax purposes, a deduction is taken 
from the taxpayer's taxable income and the taxpayer's basis in the as-
set is adjusted downward by the amount of the deduction. tot If, as 
usually happens, the fair market value of the asset has not in fact de-
creased by an amount as large as the depreciation deduction, a subse-
quent sale of the asset will result in gain to the taxpayer even if the fair 
market value of the asset has not increased during the period that the 
taxpayer has held it. Section 1231 of the Code provides for long-term 
capital gain treatment for net gain from the sale of depreciable assets. 
Until it was repealed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, section 1202 
98. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1245 (1988) (recapture as ordinary income of gains from certain depre-
ciable property); I.R.C. § 1250 (1988) (recapture as ordinary income of gains from certain depre-
ciable realty); I.R.C. § 1252 (1988) (recapture as ordinary income of certain amounts deducted 
under I.R.C. § 175 (1988) (soil and water expenditures) and I.R.C. § 182 (1988) (land clearing 
expenditures)); I.R.C. § 280F(b)(3) (1988) (recapture of excess depreciation of listed property 
not in fact predominantly used in a qualified business use); I.R.C. § 1254 (1988) (recapture as 
ordinary income of gains from disposition of certain oil, gas, or geothermal property). 
99. At least as measured by frequency of application. The disposition of any tangible depre-
ciable property connected with manufacturing, transportation, or any other business enterprise 
historically has been likely to trigger § 1245. 
100. Section 1245 and other recapture provisions that transform capital gain into ordinary 
income have, temporarily at least, lost much of their importance because of the elimination of the 
capital gains preference. The statutory structure for distinguishing between ordinary income and 
capital gains remains intact, but both are currently subject to the same tax rates. ("The current 
statutory structure for capital gains is retained in the Code to facilitate reinstatement of a capital 
gains rate differential if there is a future tax rate increase." H.R. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d 
sess. 11-106, repnizted in 1986 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4075, 4194 (Conference Re-
port accompanying Tax Reform Act of 1986)). 
101. I.R.C. § lOOl(a) (1988) provides that the gain or loss realized from the sale or other 
disposition of property is measured as the difference between the amount realized on the disposi-
tion and the property's adjusted basis. , 
I.R.C. § 101 l(a) (1988) provides that the adjusted basis for purposes of§ lOOl(a) is the basis, 
as determined under the appropriate basis section of the Code (see, e.g., I.R.C. § 1012 (1988) 
(basis equals cost unless another basis provision applies); I.R.C. § 1014 (1988) (basis of property 
acquired from a decedent); I.R.C. § 1015 (1988) (basis of property acquired by gift); I.R.C. § 332 
(1988) (basis of property received in corporate liquidation); I.R.C. § 722 (1988) (basis of contrib-
uting partner's partnership interest) (adjusted as provided by l.R.C. § 1016 (West Supp. 1990)). 
Section 1016(a) provides for a reduction in basis for various items including deductions taken 
for exhaustion, wear and tear, obsolescence, amortization, and depletion deducted under sections 
of the Code such as I.R.C. § 167 (West Supp. 1990). The reduction amount required is the 
greater of the amount (1) allowed as a deduction to the extent the deduction resulted in a tax 
benefit or (2) the amount allowable under the Code for the applicable years. See also Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.1016-3 (1960). 
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provided for a deduction from gross income of 60 percent of a tax-
payer's net capital gains, thus providing for what was in effect a lower 
capital gains tax rate. Section 1245 was designed to prevent a taxpayer 
from taking advantage of this lower capital gains rate with respect to 
any gain that arose simply because of depreciation in excess of the 
actual diminution in value of the asset. Thus, if an asset were 
purchased for $20,000 and depreciation deductions of $6800 were 
taken over a three-year period, the asset's adjusted basis would be 
$13,200. If the asset had then been sold before January 1, 1987, for its 
fair market value of $16,000, section 1245 would have prohibited the 
taxpayer from characterizing the $2800 gain as section 1231 gain sub-
ject to the long-term capital gain rate and would have required her to 
treat it as ordinary income. If the asset's actual value had appreciated 
as the asset had been depreciated, and if the asset had been sold before 
1987 for $25,000 (rather than $16,000), the entire amount of the ear-
lier depreciation deductions ($6800) would have been treated as ordi-
nary income and the rest of the gain ($5000) would have received the 
benefit of the lower rate prescribed by section 1202. The amount of 
gain converted by section 1245 into ordinary income is said to have 
been "recaptured." Without the adjustment required by section 1245, 
the taxpayer would have received the full benefit of three years of de-
preciation deductions from ordinary income and then, in effect, have 
recovered the entire (or partial, in my first example) amount of the 
earlier deduction at the lower capital gains rate. 102 Section 1245 en-
sures that the recovery (or recapture) occurs at ordinary income rates. 
The practical motivation for a provision like section 1245 is clear 
enough - to prevent a taxpayer from both receiving capital gains 
treatment on the sale of a business asset and recovering his cost for the 
asset out of ordinary income.103 This motivation arose because of the 
102. But cf. Kahn, supra note 35, at 46-53 for an argument that the assumptions that under-
lie recapture are misguided. 
103. The legislative history ofl.R.C. § 1245 confirms this underlying motivation. Testifying 
before the Senate Finance Committee before the section was adopted, the Secretary of the Treas-
ury, Douglas Dillon, said: 
The President recommended that capital gain treatment be withdrawn from gains on the 
disposition of depreciable property, both real and personal, to the extent of prior deprecia-
tion allowances. 
Such gain reflects depreciation allowances in excess of the actual decline in value of the 
asset and under the President's proposal would be treated as ordinary income. Any gain in 
excess of the cost of the asset would still be treated as capital gain. This reform would 
eliminate an unfair tax advantage which the law today gives to those who depreciate prop-
erty at a rate in excess of the actual decline in market value and then proceed to sell the 
property, thus, in effect, converting ordinary income into a capital gain. It is particularly 
essential at this time in view of the impending administrative revision of depreciation 
guidelines. 
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special rate for long-term capital gajns and goes away without it. 104 
But even though the practical motivation for a special recapture provi-
sion seems to hinge on the rate differential brought about by a capital 
gains preference, the function of the provision within the structure of 
the income tax system is somewhat broader and can be described quite 
independently of that difference. Section 1245, together with the pro-
visions which set forth the procedures for reducing basis to reflect de-
ductions taken for depreciation, 105 is a corrective device. When a 
taxpayer recovers the cost (or a portion of it) of an asset which it ac-
quired for business purposes by taking depreciation deductions, 106 it 
has taken a deduction - fully authorized by the federal income tax 
system - which, in rough theory at least, presumes a future out-
come; 107 namely, that the taxpayer will use the asset (for business pur-
poses) and that it will ultimately consume at least as much of the value 
of the asset through that use as it has deducted through the mecha-
nism of depreciation.108 As with any presumption about the future, 
2d Sess. 87-88 (1962) (emphasis added). See also 2 B. BITIKER & L. LoKKEN, supra note 22, at 
1J 55.1; M. CHIRELSTElN, supra note 22, at 1J 18.02(b); Kahn, supra note 35, at 43-46. 
104. Actually, I.R.C. § 1245 retains some practical effect in several circumstances. For ex-
ample, capital gains are still offset by capital losses while ordinary income is offset only to a very 
limited extent, see I.R.C. § 1211 (1988). Thus, characterization of gain as ordinary income by 
§ 1245 can increase a taxpayer's taxable income by reducing the deductibility of his losses. See 
also I.R.C. § 170(e) (1988) (reducing the amount ofa charitable contribution of property by the 
amount that would not have been long-term capital gain if it had been sold for fair market value); 
I.R.C. § 453(i) (1988) (recognizing § 1245 recapture income in the year of the disposition of 
property sold in an installment sale). 
105. See supra note 101. 
106. The historic function of depreciation was to recover the cost of the property being de-
preciated over the period of its economically useful life. Indeed, the phrase "cost recovery" is 
often substituted for "depreciation." See, e.g., I.R.C. § 168 (1988) ("Accelerated Cost Recovery 
System"). A depreciation deduction has been a part of the federal income tax system since 1909. 
See Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 113. It has been explained by the Supreme Court 
as follows: 
The depreciation charge permitted as a deduction from the gross income in determining the 
taxable income of a business for any year represents the reduction, during the year, of the 
capital assets through wear and tear of the plant used. The amount of the allowance for 
depreciation is the sum which should be set aside for the taxable year, in order that, at the end 
of the useful life of the plant in the business, the aggregate of the sums set aside will (with the 
salvage value) suffice to provide an amount equal to the originql cost The theory underlying 
this allowance for depreciation is that by using up the plant, a gradual sale is made of it. 
The depreciation charged is the measure of the cost of the part which has been sold. When 
the plant is disposed of after years of use, the thing then sold is not the whole thing origi-
nally acquired. The amount of the depreciation must be deducted from the original cost of 
the whole in order to determine the cost of that disposed of in the final sale of properties. 
United States v. Ludey, 274 U.S. 295, 300-01 (1927) (emphasis added). 
See also Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 272 (1966). See generally B. 
BITIKER & L. LoKKEN, supra note 22, at 1! 23.1.1; M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 22, at 1J 6.08. 
For a historical account of depreciation policies, see Lischer, Depreciation Policy: Whither Thou 
Goest, 32 Sw. L.J. 545, 546-71 (1978). 
107. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.s: 1, 3-4 (1947). 
108. See supra note 106. The original goal of tax depreciation seems to have been to devise 
methods by which the actual economic depreciation of the asset would be deducted as it oc-
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this one can turn out to be mistaken. A capital gains preference exac-
erbates the mistake; too it does not cause it. 
A fine-tooled analysis of depreciation is itself a complicated and 
controversial undertaking. Depreciation for tax purposes is a mecha-
nism for spreading the deduction of an item's cost over multiple tax 
periods. Even in a world with a currency unaffected by inflation or 
deflation, where the single goal of depreciation was to deduct as much 
of an item's cost in any period as was consumed in that period, it 
would still be exceedingly difficult to allocate cost to use accurately. 
Much of the difficulty stems from the problem of measuring consump-
tion. We would need to know a variety of things, including the value 
of the item at the beginning and end of each accounting period and 
how much of that value represented the original cost unaffected by 
fluctuations in the market price.110 The project is complicated still 
further if additional goals are introduced into the design of the depre-
ciation mechanism. The federal system has in fact used depreciation 
schedules as a tool for directing investment behavior since at least 
1954,lll and a vast literature addresses the complex questions sur-
rounding both the desirability of that practice and its implementa-
tion.112 It might well appear, therefore, that reconciliation would ill-
describe what has happened when depreciation is recaptured, because 
the amount of depreciation actually taken on an asset is often neither 
intended nor believed to be an accurate estimate of the cost that has in 
fact been consumed. Indeed, most theorists view the Accelerated Cost 
curred. See M. GRAETZ, supra note 3, at 391-92. The goal of accuracy eroded over time as 
depreciation began to be seen as a vehicle by which investment behavior could be stimulated and 
directed. The Code introduced so-called accelerated depreciation methods in 1954, and the Ac-
celerated Cost Recovery System was added to the Code as l.R.C. § 168 in 1981. ACRS short-
ened the period over which cost recovery would occur even beyond the period permitted by the 
earlier accelerated methods. In adding§ 168, Congress made it clear that its intent was to stimu-
late capital investment. See S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 47, reprinted in 1981 U.S. 
CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 105, 152. Nonetheless, the general notion persists that deprecia-
tion's basic justification is as a form of spreading the deductible cost of an asset over time. 
109. Measuring the amount of the mistake is a separate and difficult issue. 
110. For two quite different views about how, in theory, consumption should be measured, 
see M. CHlRELSTEIN, supra note 22, 11 6.08, at 137-39 (arguing that sinking fund depreciation is 
the only theoretically proper method for measuring the economic cost of an asset's use) and 
Kahn, supra note 35, at 30-43 (arguing that only some form of accelerated depreciation can 
accurately measure the cost of an asset's use); see also Blum, Accelerated Depreciation: A Proper 
Allowancefor Measuring Net Income?//, 18 MICH. L. REv. 1172 (1980), and Kahn, Accelerated 
Depreciation Revisited -A Reply to Professor Blum, 18 MICH. L. REV. 1185 (1980). 
111. See supra notes 106 and 108. 
112. See, e.g., Auerbach, The New Economics of Accelerated Depreciation, 23 B.C. L. REV. 
1327 (1982); Bradford, Issues in the Design of Savings and Investment Incentives, in DEPRECIA-
TION, INFLATION, AND THE TAXATION OF INCOME FROM CAPITAL (C. Hulten ed. 1981); 
Hulten & Wykoff, Economic Depreciation and Accelerated Depreciation: An Evaluation of the 
Conable-Jones 10-5-3 Proposal, 34 NATL. TAX J. 45 (1981). 
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Recovery System, for example, as accelerating the rate of deduction 
beyond the rate of consumption.113 That was certainly the intention of 
Congress.114 In light of all this, it hardly seems appropriate to charac-
terize accelerated depreciation deductions as "mistakes." 
In my earlier discussion of the distinction between mistakes that 
can be undone and mistakes that cannot be, I contrasted choices that 
could have been recognized as mistakes when they were made because 
all the data necessary for a fully informed decision was at least theo-
retically available by the time the choice was made with those whose 
ultimate resolution was in some sense contingent on the future. 115 
These latter choices could not, even in theory, have been decisively 
identified as mistakes when they were made. I illustrated the second 
kind of mistake with the example of my vacation trip to Kauai and the 
unexpected typhoon. 116 But this kind of example does not really cap-
ture what has happened when a taxpayer takes fully authorized depre-
ciation deductions in Year 1, only to sell the asset for more than its 
adjusted basis in Year 3. The amount of the allowable deduction is in 
no way affected by the taxpayer's reasonable belief (or even his knowl-
edge) about the likelihood of his disposing of the asset for more than 
its adjusted basis.117 Neither predictions about the particular tax-
payer's circumstances and plans nor predictions about the actual rate 
at which the taxpayer will consume the asset are relevant to determin-
ing the allowable deduction under the Accelerated Cost Recovery Sys-
tem, since the allowable deduction does not presume to represent an 
accurate assessment of an asset's rate of consumption. Thus, a more 
apt analogy would be my choosing to go to Kauai because I want to 
see a good friend who lives there even though I believe, correctly as it 
turns out, on the basis of apparently reliable weather forecasts, that a 
typhoon will strike. 
Sometimes we choose to satisfy one goal (seeing my friend) at the 
likely expense of satisfying another (avoiding typhoons). When it 
turns out that we did in fact have to sacrifice the one goal (I was 
caught in the typhoon), we might look for some way to mitigate the 
situation (some might say "to have our cake and eat it too"). In some 
sorts of circumstances, like the typhoon, that may be difficult. But in 
113. See, e.g., M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 22, ~ 6.08. 
114. See S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 48, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CooE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 105, 153. 
115. See supra text accompanying notes 62-65. 
116. See supra text accompanying notes 62-65. 
117. Indeed he is required to adjust his basis downward even if he does not avail himself of an 
allowable depreciation deduction. l.R.C. § 1016(a)(2) (1988). 
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others, it might be easier to make an adjustment, after the fact, which 
goes some way toward reconciling the conflicting goals. The recapture 
of depreciation is one of these easier adjustments. 
Annual accounting sets short-term goals for taxpayers, whereas 
the fundamental goal of depreciation is a long-term one - to allow 
taxpayers to deduct the full cost of that portion of long-lived assets 
which they actually consume for business purposes but to require that 
they allocate that cost over multiple tax years. Since the allocation 
procedures established by the Code are not a function of either the 
particular taxpayer's actual consumption of the asset or his likely 
plans for disposing of it, there is the clear possibility of a conflict be-
tween his satisfying the depreciation requirements of annual account-
ing and the long-term goal of deducting the cost of only that portion of 
the asset that he has actually consumed. Whatever our expectations, 
we can only quantify the full extent of the conflict after the entire his-
tory of the taxpayer's ownership of the asset has been determined. 
The federal income tax system responds to this quantification by mak-
ing an adjustment to a taxpayer's income in the year that he actually 
does dispose of a not-fully-consumed depreciable asset. The corrective 
is not perfect, but it does go some distance toward reconciling the con-
flict. Whether we call the quantification a "mistake"118 is of no real 
importance, but it does not seem an inappropriate label if we are clear 
about the sense of the word that I intend. The adjustment that is 
made after the "mistake" has been determined is an instance of what I 
mean by reconciliation. Like the tax benefit rule, this adjustment 
seeks to reconcile the present with the past presumption (not predic-
tion) about the future (rate of consumption of the depreciated asset) to 
make them compatible with one another. 
By itself, in fact, section 1245 only addresses the increment of the 
mistake that results from the preferred treatment given to capital 
gains. Alone, it does not remedy the central problem. That is cor-
rected, to the extent that it is, 119 by adjusting the basis of an asset each 
time a depreciation deduction is taken120 and using the asset's adjusted 
basis to measure the asset's value when it is sold or otherwise con-
verted.121 Let us return to the examples that illustrated the operation 
of section 1245: first, an asset bought for $20,000, depreciated for 
118. Albeit a mistake that has in many instances been voluntarily built into our tax system. 
119. Recapture in a later year of the excess depreciation of earlier years does not take into 
account the time value of the amount by which the taxpayer's earlier taxes were reduced by the 
excess depreciation. That amount has, in effect, been loaned to the taxpayer without interest. 
120. I.R.C. § 1016(a) (1988). See supra note 101. 
121. I.R.C. § lOOl(a) (1988). See.supra note 101. 
June 1990] Foundations of Federal Income Tax 2071 
three years by $6800, and sold for $16,000; second, the same asset sold 
for $25,000 instead of $16,000. In both of these examples the adjusted 
basis of the asset is $13,200. The amount taken into taxable income 
upon the first sale is the difference between $16,000 and $13,200 or 
$2800; upon the second, the difference between $25,000 and $13,200 
or $11,800. In the first case the entire $2800 represents so-called ex-
cess depreciation. In the second case $6800 of the $11,800 does. In 
both cases the inclusion of the amount that represents excess deprecia-
tion is an instance of reconciliation. 
III. THE NORMATIVE ROLE OF RECONCILIATION 
As I have shown, reconciliation is a general corrective device, 
available to any tax system that chooses to provide for the possibility 
that a reporting decision may be revoked in some way other than by 
return amendment. It, like realization, is a mechanism that a tax sys-
tem might use to determine whether and when to tax amounts it views 
as potentially taxable. Each of the preceding examples of phenomena 
within the federal income tax system is an instance of reconciliation. 
On the other hand, each traditionally has been described in terms that 
do not include reconciliation. What distinguishes the descriptions that 
make use of reconciliation from those that do not is that they are not 
purely descriptive. Recognizing reconciliation allows us to give a uni-
fied explanation of a number of features of the federal income tax sys-
tem, an explanation that relates these features both to one another and 
to a schematic functional account of all tax systems. 
Another feature of the federal income tax system that profitably 
can be discussed in terms of reconciliation is its treatment of loans. 122 
Conceiving of the tax treatment of simple borrowing in terms of recon-
ciliation allows us to give a more coherent account of an important 
feature of the federal income tax system than is allowed by the tradi-
tional conceptual vocabulary. To the extent that coherence is a desira-
ble feature of a tax system, this account is therefore preferable to 
others. However, conceiving of the tax treatment of simple borrowing 
in terms of reconciliation has implications for one's conception of the 
tax treatment of other kinds of loan arrangements as well. In this part 
of the article I shall explore those implications in the context of 
purchase money mortgages. It turns out, however, that the treatment 
of purchase money mortgages that is implied by the coherent account 
of simple borrowing is not consistent with the facts of current law. If 
122. Although he might not want to associate himself with my actual product, the discussion 
of loans which follows was inspired by a remark of Martin Ginsburg's. 
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coherence is an overriding value, reform of current law would be war-
ranted. If, on the other hand, coherence is allowed to compete with 
other values (assuming that it is a value at all), those values should be 
identified and their relative strengths assessed before a justified call for 
specific reform could be made. 
My choice of the tax treatment of simple borrowing and the impli-
cations of coherence for the tax treatment of mortgages as examples is 
not accidental. Early in this essay, I referred to Barnett's amicus brief 
in Tufts as an example of an argument that relies on rationality as a 
sufficient reason for interpreting the law as having certain require-
ments.123 Barnett's argument is about the tax treatment of purchase 
money mortgages upon the disposition of the asset they were used to 
purchase. Ironically, given the importance that he ascribes to the ra-
tionality of the tax system, Barnett's own argument seems tacitly to 
accept the traditional account of the tax treatment of simple 
borrowing.124 
A. Simple Borrowing 
A system might treat borrowed funds as potentially taxable or not 
potentially taxable. The federal income tax system, of course, does not 
regard loan proceeds as taxable income to the borrower.125 This might 
mean that the federal system chooses to exclude loans from taxation, 
even though it regards them as potentially taxable amounts, or it 
might mean that it does not regard them as potentially taxable at all. 
The familiar justification for the rule that loan proceeds are not in-
cluded in taxable income is that the borrower's obligation to repay 
offsets the amount borrowed and leaves her net worth unaffected. 126 
As she repays, her liability diminishes by the amount of the repayment 
and her net worth remains the same. By contrast, however, the federal 
system does include borrowed amounts in the basis of any asset they 
are used to buy. 127 This treatment is inconsistent with the view that 
123. See supra text accompanying notes 3-7. 
124. See Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 3, at 4-5. 
125. See, e.g., Shuster v. Helvering, 121 F.2d 643, 645 (2d Cir. 1941); Matarese v. Commis-
sioner, 34 T.C.M. 791 (CCH) (1975); Gatlin v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 50 (1936); Stayton v. 
Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 940 (1935), nonacq., 1936 C.B. 44; Dilks v. Commissioner, 15 B.T.A. 
1294 (1929), affd., 69 F.2d 1002 (7th Cir. 1934); Fisher v. Commissioner, 7 B.T.A. 968, 969 
(1927), acq., 1928 C.B. 11. One exception to this rule is I.R.C. § 77 (1988), which permits trut-
payers to elect to include loans from the Commodity Credit Corporation in gross income. 
126. See, e.g., Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 3, at 3; B. BITTKER & L. LoKKEN, supra 
note 22, at~ 6.4.1; M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 22, ~ 3.01, at 44; M. GRAETZ, supra note 3, at 
216; Coven, Limiting Losses Attributable to Nonrecourse Debt: A Defense of the Traditional Sys-
tem Against the At-Risk Concept, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 41, 63 (1986); Popkin, The Taxation of 
Bo"owing, 56 IND. L.J. 43, 43 (1980). 
127. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 11 (1947). Borrowed amounts are generally includ-
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loan proceeds are not taxable income, since basis is supposed to be a 
measure of the after-tax cost of an asset, 128 and the borrowed dollars 
have neither been taxed nor repaid and, cannot, consistently with the 
view that they are not taxable income, be taxed. Despite the inclusion 
of untaxed loan proceeds in its measure, basis is nonetheless the 
amount used to calculate depreciation deductions.129 This means, ob-
able in basis whether the debt is recourse or nonrecourse. 331 U.S. at 10-11; see also Commis-
sioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 307 (1983) (nonrecourse mortgage to be treated as "true" loan); 
Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 1976) (absence of personal 
liability does not deprive debt of its bona fide character). In Tufts, the Supreme Court empha-
sized that Crane had upheld the Commissioner's choice to treat nonrecourse debts as he treated 
recourse debt ("The Commissioner might have adopted the theory •.. that a nonrecourse mort-
gage is not true debt • . . . Because the taxpayer's investment in the property would not include 
the nonrecourse debt, the taxpayer would not be permitted to include that debt in basis." 461 
U.S. at 308 n.5) and indicated that it was now merely reaffirming Crane ("We express no view as 
to whether such an approach would be consistent with the statutory structure and, if so, and 
Crane were not on the books, whether that approach would be preferred over Crane's analysis." 
461 U.S. at 308 n.5 (citations omitted)). 
However, the Commissioner may attack nonrecourse indebtedness as lacking in economic 
substance if, at the time the debt is incurred, the foreseeable value of the property that secures it 
is less than the indebtedness amount, an indication that the borrower will not repay it. See Rice's 
Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 184 (1983) (nonrecourse debt invalid since foresee-
able value of encumbered property less than principal amount of debt), modified 752 F.2d 89 (4th 
Cir. 1985); Hilton v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 305 (1980) (foreseeable value of the encumbered 
property must make abandonment imprudent for nonrecourse debt to exist), affd., 671 F.2d 316 
(9th Cir. 1982); Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 752 (1975) (for debt to exist, nonre-
course borrower must have economic incentive to make capital investment in unpaid amount), 
affd., 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976) • 
Inclusion in basis may also be denied if the indebtedness is adjudged contingent on its face. 
See, e.g., Fox v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 972 (1983) (notes payable out of proceeds too contin-
gent), affd. sub nom., Barnard v. Commissioner, 731 F.2d 230 (4th Cir. 1984); Lemery v. Com-
missioner, 52 T.C. 367 (1969) (contingent on profits), affd. per curiam, 451 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 
1971); Albany Car Wheel Co. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 831 (1963), affd. per curiam, 333 F.2d 
653 (2d Cir. 1964); Rev. Rul. 80-235, 1980-2 C.B. 229 (1980) (limited partnership nonrecourse 
note payable out of cash flow too contingent). 
128. See I.R.C. §§ lOOl(a), lOll(a), and 1016(a) (1988), described supra note 101, for the 
statutory structure from which this observation is derived. See also supra note 21 and accompa-
nying text. There are notable exceptions to the general conception of basis as representative of 
after-tax cost. When a corporation exchanges its own stock (in which it has no basi~) for prop-
erty it recognizes no income. I.R.C. § 1032 (1988). Yet I.R.C. § 362 (1988) provides that the 
corporation's basis in the acquired property will be the same as it was in the hands of the trans-
feror, increased in the amount of gain recognized to the transferor on such transfer. A similar 
rule governs the basis of property received by a partnership in exchange for a partnership inter-
est. I.R.C. § 723 (1988). See generally Manning, The Issuer's Paper: Property or What? Zero 
Basis and Other Income Tax Mysteries, 39 TAX L. REv. 159 (1984). 
129. I.R.C. § 167(a) (1988), the basic authorization provision for depreciation deductions, 
provides for the deduction of a "reasonable allowance" for the exhaustion, wear and tear, and 
obsolescence of property used in a trade or business or for the production of income. Section 
167(g) provides that this deduction must be based on the adjusted basis provided in§ 1011. See 
supra note 101. Tangible property placed in service after 1980 and before 1987 is subject to the 
Accelerated Cost Recovery System rules of old § 168. Under this provision, depreciation deduc-
tions are based on the taxpayer's "unadjusted basis" in the property as defined in old§ 168(d). 
Property placed in service after December 31, 1986 is subject to the rules of current§ 168, which 
relies on the definition of adjusted basis in § 167(d). 
The at-risk rules of I.R.C. § 465 (1988) have the effect of placing some limitations on the 
deductibility of depreciation on assets purchased with nonrecourse financing. In general, § 465 
limits a taxpayer's annual deductible loss for certain activities engaged in as a trade or business or 
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viously enough, that borrowed funds can produce significant tax bene-
fits '(not to mention the significant economic benefit of being able to 
invest the entire borrowed amount while deferring its repayment)13o 
before they are taxed.131 For my present purposes, however, the more 
important observation is that borrowed funds are a sort of hybrid in 
the federal income tax system. For some purposes (e.g., calculating 
taxable income) they are not treated as taxable income, while for other 
purposes (e.g., cost recovery) they are treated as if they had been taxa-
ble income. 
The apparent hybrid character of the tax treatment of loan pro-
ceeds suggests that the concern with net worth that characterizes the 
justification for noninclusion might not in fact function within the fed-
eral income tax system as a factor for distinguishing potentially taxa-
ble amounts. Rather, for good reasons or bad, it may function within 
the system as an indicator of when to exclude potentially taxable 
amounts from taxation. Otherwise, if "no change in net worth" is 
taken as seriously meaning "not within the scope of the system" (as 
opposed to "excluded from taxable income"), the inclusion of untaxed 
loan proceeds in basis represents a genuine systemic incoherence. To 
pose the question in terms of the simple structural model of an income 
tax system suggested in Part I of this article:132 Are loan proceeds not 
taxed at receipt because they are not even within the purview of the 
system, or are they potentially taxable amounts that are excluded from 
taxation? If they are conceived of as potentially taxable amounts that 
are excluded from taxation (probably because of the offsetting obliga-
tion and the resultant sameness of net worth) on the presumption that 
repayment will be made, systemic coherence can be preserved. A de-
scription of the account that would be given under this analysis of loan 
arrangements should illustrate the point. 
for the production of income to the amount for which the taxpayer is economically at risk. 
When the at-risk rules were added to the Code in 1976, they classified nonrecourse debt as 
amounts for which the taxpayer was not at risk. This restriction was considerably modified in 
1986. For post-1986 losses with respect to real property, an exception is now provided for "qual-
ified nonrecourse financing." I.R.C. § 465(b)(6) (1988). Generally, qualified nonrecourse financ-
ing is nonrecourse financing which has both been provided by an organization that is in the 
business oflending and is secured by real estate used in the activity. For an argument that the at-
risk concept is wrong in principle, see Coven, supra note 126. 
130. See, e.g., Popkin, supra note 126, at 44-45. 
131. "By holding that nonrecourse liabilities are includable in the taxpayer's basis for prop-
erty, Crane laid the foundation stone of most tax shelters ..•• " Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonre-
course Debt and the Crane Case, 33 TAX L. REv. 277, 283 (1978). See, e.g., M. CHIRBLSfEIN, 
supra note 22, at~ 13.01; Ginsburg, The Leaky Tax Shelter, 53 TAXES 719 (1975); McKee, The 
Real Estate Tax Shelter: A Computerized Expose. 57 VA. L. R.Ev. 521 (1971); Popkin, supra note 
126. 
132. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17. 
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If a taxpayer borrows $1000 at a standard rate of interest133 in 
Year 1 and pays back the principal per the loan agreement in a lump 
sum five years later, he is not taxed on the $1000 that he borrowed 
(although he may well have repaid the loan with funds that have been 
taxed, their treatment is entirely a function of their own source). The 
suggested analysis would simply describe the taxpayer as having ex-
cluded the loan proceeds from taxation on the presumption that repay-
ment in full would be made in the future. If the loan were forgiven in 
Year 2, the taxpayer would be taxed on the amount of the forgiven 
principal in Year 2. The suggested analysis would explain this result 
in terms of reconciliation. The loan proceeds were excluded in Year 1 
on the assumption of their future repayment. When that proves false, 
the earlier exclusion is corrected by reconciling it with the current sit-
uation and including the forgiven amount in Year 2's taxable income. 
Year 2's taxable income is not, under this account, a new potentially 
taxable amount entering the purview of the income tax system for the 
first time because of the increase in the taxpayer's net worth. Recon-
ciliation allows us to account coherently for the current treatment of 
simple borrowing and discharge of indebtedness. 
B. Purchase Money Mortgages, Footnote 37 and the Issue in Tufts 
This analysis of simple borrowing, consistently applied, implies an 
analysis of purchase money mortgages. If the $1000 loan in the above 
example were a purchase money mortgage, and the asset acquired 
were sold later for an amount that included the assumption of the 
mortgage liability, the implied analysis of the loan relief would be 
stated similarly in terms of reconciliation. 
1. The Implications of Coherence 
Consider, then, a range of illustrative cases. In each of these exam-
ples assume, unless otherwise specified, that the asset held by the tax-
payer is nondepreciable, that the sale takes place in Year 3, and that 
the outstanding principal on the loan remains $1000. 
133. Assume here, and throughout the discussion infra of examples A-M(NR), that the in-
terest payments are based on a fixed rate and are unconditionally payable during the term of the 
loan at six-month intervals. This assumption will allow the discussion to proceed schematically 
without the added (but unnecessary for my purposes) complexity introduced by the original issue 
discount rules of I.R.C. §§ 1271-75 (1988 & West Supp. 1990). For a detailed analysis of how 
the original issue discount rules work see McCawley, Time Value of Money: OID and Imputed 
Interest, 333-3d Tax Mgmt. (BNA) (1990). 
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EXAMPLE A 
Mortgage Liability 
Face value = $1000 
Asset 
Basis = $1000 
FMV = $1200 
[Vol. 88:2034 
Purchaser assumes the mortgage liability and pays an additional 
$200 to acquire the asset. 
This transaction, like any sale, has two conceptually distinct com-
ponents to be accounted for by each taxpayer - the amount received 
and the amount given up. Here the seller has given up an asset with a 
basis of $1000 and has received relief from a liability of $1000 plus 
$200 in cash.134 Each of these components can be separately analyzed. 
1. The asset given up: The taxpayer receives value of $1200 for 
an asset in which he had a basis of $1000. He realizes $200 gain. 
2. The liability relief received: At the time the loan was incurred 
the taxpayer had excluded the amount of the proceeds ($1000) from 
his income on the presumption that he would later repay that amount 
in its entirety. Here the taxpayer is giving up an asset worth $1200 to 
receive relief from the $1000 liability plus $200 in cash. Put another 
way, the taxpayer is repaying the $1000 liability in full, as per the 
earlier presumption, and so no corrective measure is appropriate. 
EXAMPLEB 
Mortgage Liability 
Face value = $1000 
Asset 
Basis = $1000 
FMV = $900 
Purchaser assumes the mortgage liability and acquires the asset 
plus an additional $100. 
1. The asset given up: The taxpayer receives value of $1000 in 
exchange for an asset in which he had a basis of $1000 and an addi-
tional $100 in cash. He received $900 for the asset alone and thus he 
realizes a loss of $100. 
2. The liability relief received: The taxpayer is giving up an asset 
worth $900, along with another $100 in cash, in exchange for relief 
from a $1000 liability. Thus he is repaying the liability in full, consis-
tent with the presumption behind the original exclusion of the $1000 
loan proceeds. 
134. For an analysis of this and the next three examples from the purchaser's perspective see 
infra text accompanying notes 151-57. 
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EXAMPLEC 
Mortgage Liability Asset 
Face value = $1000 Basis = $1000 
$800 = cost to FMV = $1000 
discharge at time of 
sale [or amount one 
could now borrow 
on the same terms] 
(i.e., the prevailing 
interest rate for 
similar loans has 
gone up) 
2077 
Purchaser assumes the mortgage liability and pays an additional 
$200 to acquire the asset. 
1. The asset given up: Perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively, the 
seller only receives $1000 of value for the asset. This can be seen if one 
focuses on the value of the assumed mortgage liability from the pur-
chaser's perspective. Because interest rates have risen in the three 
years since the original loan was taken out, it would cost an additional 
$200 now to borrow $1000. This means that a promise now to abide 
by the repayment terms of the earlier loan would only finance a loan of 
roughly $800 and that it would therefore cost the purchaser an addi-
tional $200 simply to relieve the seller of the liability of $1000. 
2. The liability relief received: The taxpayer gives up an asset 
worth $1000 in order to be relieved of a $1000 liability and receive 
$200 in cash. When he originally excluded the $1000 loan proceeds he 
did so on the presumption that he would repay the full amount. In 
fact he is satisfying his entire liability for only $800. The premise be-
hind the earlier exclusion has therefore turned out to be mistaken. 
The mistake can be ameliorated by reconciling the current year's re-
payment of $800 with the earlier year's presumption of repayment and 
consequent exclusion of $1000. This results in $200 being included in 
the current year's taxable income. 
At least two things should be noted about this analysis. First, 
although its practical consequences are less in a system without a spe-
cial tax rate for long-term capital gains than they would be in one 
whose rate structure distinguished between kinds of taxable income, 135 
the $200 gain to the taxpayer results from the sale of the asset but does 
not represent gain from that sale associated with the appreciation of 
the asset. The analysis therefore implies that if the asset were a capital 
135. See supra note 101. 
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asset, the $200 would not be long-term capital gain. This is in contrast 
to current federal income tax law. Current federal law does not, in 
fact, bifurcate transactions of this sort as the analysis suggests.136 In-
stead, relying on Crane's131 inclusion oftheface value of any mortgage 
liability assumed by the purchaser as part of the seller's amount real-
ized (and ignoring the fact that the cost to discharge the mortgage 
liability has changed), it simply focuses on the asset. Thus, the asset in 
Example Chas a basis of $1000 and the seller has received $1200 (face 
value of the mortgage liability assumed plus the additional $200) for 
it. 138 The gain is characterized as gain from the sale of the asset -
capital gain if the asset was a capital asset. 
Second, under the suggested analysis, the $200 gain does not repre-
sent a newly realized potentially taxable amount. Rather, it represents 
an amount that was excluded from taxable income when it was first 
identified as potentially taxable but which, in the light of the future 
that has come to be, should not be excluded after all. Its current 
recognition is not a function of its being newly realized but of the cur-
rent reconciliation of the present situation with mistaken past 
presumptions. 
EXAMPLED 
Mortgage Liability Asset 
Face value = $1000 Basis = $1000 
Cost to discharge = $1100 FMV = $1000 
(The prevailing interest rate for similar loans has 
gone down.) 
Purchaser assumes the mortgage liability and acquires the asset 
plus $100. 
1. The asset given up: For reasons analogous to those given in 
this part of the discussion of Example C, the purchaser could borrow 
roughly $1100 at Year 3's lower interest rate for the same total cost 
that he would have incurred to borrow $1000 three years earlier. This 
means that in an arm's length transaction he would require $1100 of 
value in exchange for his assumption of the three-year-old mortgage 
liability. Here, he receives $100 in cash and the asset, which must be 
136. However, if the lender conditioned the purchaser's assumption of the mortgage liability 
on the modification of its terms, I.R.C. § 1274(c)(4) (West Supp. 1990) and Prop. Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.1274-l(c), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,082 (1986), appear to bifurcate the transaction in a highly stylized 
way by treating the modified mortgage liability as a new mortgage liability which was exchanged 
for the original mortgage liability. 
137. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947). 
138. I.R.C. § lOOl(b) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a) (1980). 
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valued at $1000. Since the seller-taxpayer's basis in the asset is $1000, 
he has no gain or loss with respect to the asset. 
2. The liability relief received: The seller gives up both an asset 
worth $1000 and an additional $100 to be relieved of a $1000 liability. 
He has thus fully repaid the $1000 which was earlier excluded from 
his taxable income on the presumption of later repayment. There is no 
mistake to correct, and hence no reconciliation is needed. He has, of 
course, spent an additional $100 in order to procure the liability relief. 
A system could choose to characterize that expenditure as deductible 
or not. 
Again, current federal income tax law yields a different result. It 
ignores the fact that the cost required to discharge the mortgage has 
changed, and simply treats this transaction as the exchange of cash 
and an asset with a total basis of $1100 for mortgage relief of $1000. 
The result is a $100 asset loss. The bifurcation of the transaction into 
its "asset given up" side and its "liability relief received" side is a logi-
cal consequence of the suggestion that the apparent incoherence of the 
federal system's exclusion from tax of borrowed amounts and its con-
current inclusion of them in the basis of assets that they are used to 
acquire could be cured by conceiving of borrowed amounts as having 
been excluded from taxation on the presumption that full repayment 
would be made in the future. The inclusion in income of forgiven loan 
amounts could therefore be accounted for as instances of 
reconciliation. 
As I indicated earlier, Barnett, in his Tufts amicus brief conceives 
of cases of this sort as requiring bifurcated analysis. 139 In his view, it is 
irrational to ignore the fact that the value of a liability can vary just as 
the value of any asset can. Thus he posits the general rule that "the 
gain or loss realized by a purchase of relief from a liability is equal to 
the difference between the adjusted basis of the liability and the 
amount expended for the relief."140 According to Barnett, the amount 
of "the obligor's prior receipt for accepting the liability [is] his basis 
for the liability."141 Barnett values systemic rationality highly. There 
is some evidence that he regards it as a sufficient reason for interpret-
ing the law as in fact providing one thing rather than another. 142 
Nonetheless, his own analysis does not proceed from concern that the 
federal system's basic treatment of simple borrowing is systemically 
incoherent. Indeed, he seems to accept the net worth rationale with-
139. See supra text accompanying note 6. 
140. Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 3, at 5. 
141. Id. 
142. See supra text accompanying notes 5-7. 
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out question.143 As a result, Barnett's bifurcated analysis is somewhat 
different from the one I am spelling out here. In each of the preceding 
examples, Barnett would analyze the liability relief received in terms 
of the taxpayer's basis in the liability (its face value in these examples) 
and the amount expended to procure relief. When the taxpayer, like 
the taxpayer in Example C, gives up assets worth less than the face 
value of the liability, he will realize liability gain in the amount of the 
difference between the face value of the liability and what he gave up 
for the liability relief alone, $200 of ordinary income in Example C. 
This amount, and its characterization, should always be the ~ame as 
that yielded by my analysis even though the descriptions of what has 
happened differ. However, when the taxpayer, like the taxpayer in 
Example D, gives up assets worth more than the face value of the 
liability in exchange for relief from the liability, the two analyses yield 
interestingly different results. Under Barnett's analysis, such a tax-
payer would realize a liability loss in the amount of the difference be-
tween what he gave up in exchange for relief from the liability and his 
basis in the liability (face value). This would be a $100 liability loss in 
Example D. My reconciliation analysis, by contrast, does not regard 
the taxpayer as having suffered a loss. He has simply spent $100 more 
to procure liability relief than he expected to. 
Example D is related to Example B just as C is to A. The form of 
the transaction in D is identical to that in B, just as that of C is identi-
cal to that in A. The difference in the analyses of the hypotheticals 
within each pair is entirely a function of whether either the value of 
the asset has changed from Year 1 to Year 3 or the prevailing interest 
rate for a purchase money mortgage of $1000 is different in Year 3 
from what it was in Year 1. One of the two variables remains constant 
in each of the four hypotheticals. In the next four hypotheticals, both 
the value of the property and the prevailing interest rate have changed. 
EXAMPLEE 
Mortgage Liability Asset 
Face value = $1000 Basis = $1000 
Cost to discharge= $800 FMV = $1100 
(The prevailing interest rate for similar loans has 
gone up.) 
Purchaser assumes the mortgage liability and pays an additional 
$300 to acquire the asset. 
1. The asset given up: For precisely the same reasons as those 
143. Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 3, at 3. 
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given in this part of the discussion of Example C, the seller here has 
received $1100 of value for the asset; $800 associated with the loan 
assumption and $300 in cash. Since the asset's basis was $1000 he 
realized a $100 gain. 
2. The liability relief recovered: The taxpayer repays a total of 
$800 of the previously excluded $1000 loan. He gives up ari asset 
worth $1100 in exchange for relief from $1000 of liability plus an addi-
tional $300 in cash. Reconciliation would square the previous as-
sumption with the actual resolution of the debt and include $200 in 
Year 3's taxable income. · 
For the reasons discuss'ed above, Barnett's analysis would yield the 
same results. Federal income tax law currently lumps the asset gain 
and the liability gain together and characterizes all $300 as asset gain. 
By now the pattern of the analysis should be clear. 
EXAMPLEF 
Mortgage Liability Asset 
Face value = $1000 Basis = $1000 
Cost to discharge = $800 FMV = $900 
(The prevailing interest rate for similar loans has 
gone up.) 
Purchaser assumes the mortgage liability and pays an additional 
$100 to acquire the asset. 
1. The asset given up: The taxpayer has received value of $800 
(mortgage liability assumed) plus $100 (cash), or $900. Loss on the 
asset equals $100. 
2. The liability relief received: $1000 of relief received at a cost of 
$900 (asset) less $100 (cash received) equals $800. Reconciliation gain 
is $200. 
Barnett's result would be the same. Federal law offsets the gain 
against the loss and calls it $100 asset gain. 
EXAMPLEG 
Mortgage Liability Asset 
Face value = $1000 Basis = $1000 
Cost to discharge= $1100 FMV = $1100 
(The prevailing interest rate for similar loans has 
gone down.) 
Purchaser assumes the mortgage liability in exchange for the a8set. 
1. The asset given up: The taxpayer receives value of $1100 
(mortgage liability assumed). Gain on the asset equals $100. 
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2. The liability relief received: $1000 of previously excluded loan 
receipts are repaid with the equivalent of $1100. No reconciliation is 
called for (see the discussion in part 2 of Example D). 
Barnett's analysis would differ exactly as it did in Example D and 
treat this as $100 asset gain and $100 liability loss. Under current law 
no gain or loss would be recognized. 
EXAMPLEH 
Mortgage Liability Asset 
Face value = $1000 Basis = $1000 
Cost to discharge= $1100 FMV = $900 
(The prevailing interest rate for similar loans has 
gone down.) 
Purchaser assumes the mortgage liability and acquires the asset 
plus an additional $200. 
1. The asset given up: The taxpayer receives value of $1100 
(mortgage liability assumed) less $200 (cash paid), or $900. Loss on 
the asset equals $100. 
2. The liability relief received: $1000 of relief is received at a cost 
of $900 (asset) plus $200 (cash) equals $1100. No reconciliation is 
called for. 
Barnett would treat the seller as sustaining $100 asset loss and 
$100 liability loss. The federal income tax treats the seller as having a 
$200 asset loss. 
A central tenet of federal income tax law ever since Crane was 
decided in 1947 has been that it does not distinguish between recourse 
and nonrecourse borrowing.144 Thus, Crane held that the amount re-
alized by someone who sells mortgaged property includes the face 
amount of the mortgage, regardless of whether the seller is personally 
liable for the debt. A corollary of this holding has been that the tax-
payer's basis in the property includes the amount of any purchase 
money mortgage. However, the analysis of purchase money mort-
gages implied by the "reconciliation" analysis of simple borrowing 
suggests distinguishing between recourse and nonrecourse mortgages 
in some contexts. 
If the purchase money mortgage is a nonrecourse loan, secured by 
the asset whose fair market value has dropped, the taxpayer would 
have no economic motivation to compensate a purchaser by paying 
him the difference between the face value of the loan and the fair mar-
144. See supra notes 5 and 131. For a concise and informative history of the tax treatment of 
nonrecourse debt in the federal income tax, see Shaviro, 44 TAX L. REv. 401, 420-27 (1989). 
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ket value of the asset. He does not need the purchaser in order to 
satisfy his obligation, but can simply turn the asset over to the lender/ 
secured-interest holder. This fact suggests an important distinction 
between the presumptions that underlie recourse and nonrecourse 
purchase money mortgages. 
Under the analysis that I have suggested, when someone borrows 
money, excludes it, but nonetheless includes the amount of the loan in 
the basis of the asset that it is used to acquire, a presumption is made. 
When the loan is a recourse loan, the presumption is that its face 
amount will be repaid in full. As Examples C, E, and F have illus-
trated, sometimes loans can be discharged for less than their face 
value. When this occurs, the analysis suggests that an adjustment 
might be made to the taxpayer's current ordinary income to reconcile 
actual events with the earlier presumption about the resolution of the 
loan. 
But, when the loan is a nonrecourse loan, the presumption is 
slightly different: the face amount of the loan will be repaid in full as 
long as the fair market value of the property that secures it does not 
drop below the face amount of the loan. Otherwise, the loan will be 
repaid to the extent of the fair market value of the underlying prop-
erty. The presumption, therefore, has two parts. First, like the case of 
a recourse loan, a presumption is made about the future cost of dis-
charging the obligation. If this turns out not to be accurate, reconcili-
ation might be appropriate. Second, and unlike the case of a recourse 
loan, an additional presumption is made about the future value of the 
asset acquired with the loan proceeds. The presumption is that the 
full face amount of the loan represents the appropriate amount to in-
clude in the asset's basis, because the fair market value of the asset will 
not fall below that face amount and the amount of after-tax invest-
ment in the asset (attributable to the loan) will thus tum out to be the 
face amount of the loan rather than a lesser amount. If this presump-
tion turns out to be inaccurate, 145 the remedy might be to adjust the 
taxpayer's amount realized/or the asset to reconcile actual events with 
145. Current federal income tax doctrine distinguishes between "true" debt and contingent 
debt. A number of courts have upheld the Internal Revenue Service's contention that an inade-
quately secured nonrecourse loan is too contingent to be characterized as debt includable in the 
basis of the asset which secures it. Rev. Ru!. 77-110, 1977-1 CB 58; see, e.g., Brannen v. Com-
missioner, 722 F.2d 695 (11th Cir. 1984); Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 
89 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Estate of Franklin, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976). My analysis of the 
two-part presumption underlying the inclusion of a nonrecourse loan in the securing asset's basis 
involves a different kind of contingency. Traditional contingent loan concerns center on uncer-
tainty about the value of the securing asset at the time that it is acquired. This is hardly surpris-
ing since the issue invariably arises in the context in which the lender and the seller of the asset 
are the same taxpayer. The contingency which characterizes my presumption involves uncer-
tainty about the value of the securing asset at the time that it is sold. 
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the earlier presumptions that the fair market value of the asset would 
not drop below the face amount of the loan that it secured. 
Consider three more hypotheticals. ("NR" indicates that the loan 
is nonrecourse.) 
EXAMPLE I (NR) 
Mortgage Liability Asset 
Face value = $1000 Basis = $1000 
Cost to discharge= $1000 FMV = $900 
No purchaser would reasonably assume the mortgage liability. 
Taxpayer abandons the asset to mortgagee and is thereby relieved of 
his obligation. 
1. The asset given up: The taxpayer's basis in the asset is the 
amount of the loan that it is presumed will be repaid. Precisely speak-
ing, that amount should be the lesser of $1000 or the fair market value 
of the asset at the time of its disposition or abandonment. Less pre-
cisely speaking, the basis is presumed to be $1000. The basis has, in 
effect, been "rounded up" to the only determinable amount available 
at the time that the asset is acquired. When the fair market value of 
the asset drops to $900 and the taxpayer abandons the asset to the 
mortgagee, it becomes apparent that the presumption of $1000 has 
turned out to be incorrect, even though the more precisely stated pre-
sumption was correct. The current situation could be reconciled with 
the earlier presumption either by adjusting current income directly or 
by making an adjustment to the taxpayer's current basis in the asset. 
Adjusting basis to reflect the fa~t that the fair market value of the asset 
at the time of its disposition turned out to be less than the face amount 
of the loan would result, here, in a basis of $900, and there would be 
no gain or loss on the abandonment of the asset. 
2. The liability relief received: The taxpayer has been relieved of 
a liability equal to the lesser of $1000 or the fair market value of the 
asset that secures it. He has achieved this relief by giving up the secur-
ing asset. He has thus repaid the liability in full, consistent with the 
repayment assumptions behind the original exclusion of the loan 
proceeds. 
Example I(NR) is similar to Example B. Because his loan was a 
recourse liability, however, the seller in B could not simply abandon 
the devalued asset to the mortgagee without further consequence. 
Thus, he had to pay an additional $100 to a purchaser to be rid of the 
obligation. 
Example I(NR) is familiar to tax lawyers as the case whose out-
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come was left in doubt by the Supreme Court in its famous footnote 37 
to the Crane decision: 
Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the amount of the 
mortgage, a mortgagor who is not personally liable cannot realize a ben-
efit equal to the mortgage. Consequently, a different problem might be 
encountered where a mortgagor abandoned the property or transferred it 
subject to the mortgage without receiving boot. That is not this case.146 
Thirty-six years later in Tufts, 147 the Supreme Court finally re-
turned to that case. Its answer was somewhat anticlimactic. Since 
Crane does not distinguish generally between recourse and nonre-
course loans, and since Crane always includes in a seller's amount re-
alized the face amount of any recourse liability assumed by a 
purchaser, the face amount of any nonrecourse debt assumed or for-
given (the practical effect of abandonment) should be included in a 
seller's amount realized as well. 148 The result in Example I(NR) is 
that the taxpayer recognizes no gain or loss on the abandonment of the 
asset because he is conceived as having realized $1000 for an asset in 
which his basis is also $1000. Although the rationale is different, the 
same result is suggested by the above analysis. Barnett's result would 
be the same as well. 
EXAMPLE J (NR) 
Mortgage Liability Asset 
Face value = $1000 Basis = $1000 
Cost to discharge = $800 FMV = $800 
(The prevailing interest rate for similar loans has 
gone up.) 
Purchaser assumes the mortgage liability in exchange for the asset. 
1. The asset given up: The taxpayer's basis in the asset should be 
described in exactly the same way as the taxpayer's basis in the asset in 
Example l(NR) was. Since the fair market value of the asset at the 
time of its disposition had dropped to $800, the original basis was, in 
effect, overstated by $200. As seller, the taxpayer is receiving value of 
$800 (current cost to discharge the mortgage) for an asset whose basis 
is $1000 but whose adjusted basis, as things turned out, should be 
$800. Reconciliation could correct for the basis overstatement by dis-
allowing the $200 asset loss that would otherwise be indicated by this 
bifurcated form of analysis. 
2. The liability relief received: The taxpayer has satisfied an obli-
146. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. l, 14 n.37 (1947). 
147. Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983). 
148. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307-10. 
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gation to repay the lesser of $1000 or the fair market value of the asset 
that secures it, for the latter amount. There is no mistake to correct, 
nor is there any gain or loss to recognize. 
Once again, this result is consistent with Crane and Tufts. The 
taxpayer would recognize no gain or loss on the transaction because he 
would have exchanged an asset with a basis of $1000 for relief from a 
$1000 liability. Barnett's analysis, on the other hand, since it does not 
distinguish between recourse and nonrecourse loans, would treat the 
taxpayer as having realized a $200 asset loss and a $200 liability gain. 
EXAMPLE K (NR) 
Mortgage Liability Asset 
Face value = $1000 Basis = $1000 
Cost to discharge = $800 FMV = $900 
(The prevailing interest rate for similar loans has 
gone up.) 
Purchaser assumes the mortgage liability and pays an additional 
$100 to acquire the asset. 
1. The asset given up: The taxpayer has received value of $900. 
The basis was thus overstated by $100, and there is no gain or loss. 
2. The liability relief received: $900 of liability satisfied for $900 
(fair market value of asset) less $100 (cash received) equals $800. 
Gain is $100. 
This is the same set of facts as those in Example F, except that the 
loan is nonrecourse. Since neither Barnett nor (in this context) cur-
rent federal practice distinguish between recourse and nonrecourse 
loans, their analyses of Example K(NR) would not differ from their 
analyses of Example F. 
It is important not to lose sight of the point of the suggested analy-
sis. This analysis follows from an account of simple borrowing that 
can account for the hybrid treatment of loan proceeds by the federal 
income tax system without inherent incoherency. Since loan proceeds 
used to purchase a depreciable asset are included in the asset's basis, 
they are treated, for that purpose at least, as taxable income within the 
federal system. This flies in the face of any account of loans, like the 
net worth account, that explains their nontaxation by distinguishing 
them from taxable income. 
Tufts forces us to confront the incoherence directly. It involves an 
asset whose original basis included the face amount of a purchase 
money mortgage, whose adjusted basis reflected depreciation deduc-
tions, and whose fair market value at the time of its sale was less than 
the face value of the loan assumed by the purchaser. The following 
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two hypotheticals are representative of facts like Tufts~ Example L 
assumes a recourse loan. Example M(NR) assumes a nonrecourse 
loan. 
EXAMPLEL 
Mortgage Liability Asset 
Face value = $1000 Original basis = $1000 
Cost to discharge = $800 Depreciation deductions taken = $200 
Adjusted basis = $800 FMV = $800 
(!'he prevailing interest rate for similar loans has gone up.) 
Purchaser assumes the mortgage liability in exchange for the asset. 
1. The asset given up: The current cost to discharge a $1000 
mortgage at Year l's interest rate is $800. The value received by the 
seller is therefore $800, and he realizes no gain or loss. 
2. The liability relief received: The taxpayer-seller has repaid a 
$1000 loan with an asset worth $800. Thus, the $1000 loan proceeds 
that were excluded in Year 1 on the assumption that they would be 
repaid in full, have been repaid with only $800. Reconciliation cor-
rects for the mistake and prescribes a $200 gain. 
EXAMPLE M (NR) 
Mortgage Liability Asset 
Face value = $1000 Original basis = $1000 
Cost to discharge = $800 Depreciation deductions taken = $200 
Adjusted basis = $800 FMV = $800 
(!'he prevailing interest rate for similar loans has gone up.) 
Purchaser assumes the mortgage liability in exchange for the asset. 
1. The asset given up: The original basis of the asset turns out to 
have been, in effect, overstated by $200. If one ignores for the moment 
the added complications of the effect of that overstatement on the de-
preciation deductions taken, reconciliation would suggest that the ad-
justed basis should be thought of as $600, and a $200 asset gain would 
seem to have been realized. Depreciation, however, complicates the 
answer in two ways. First, if we assume that there is no need to recon-
cile for the extra depreciation that resulted from the overstatement in 
the original basis, the gain that reconciliation suggests might well be 
treated as properly characterized in accordance with <the applicable 
rules for the recapture of excess depreciation.149 Theoretically any-
way, all excess depreciation should be taken into income, character-
ized just as it was when it was taken out. Second, there is the issue of 
149. For a schematic description of the role of a recapture rule see supra text accompanying 
notes 101-02. 
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how to adjust for the fact that the actual depreciation was based on an 
inflated basis. If a goal of reconciliation is to be wholly corrective, 
then the proper way to think of the new adjusted basis is as it would 
have been had the original basis been $800 and had depreciation de-
ductions been calculated and taken accordingly. This would result in 
a revised adjusted basis of something more than $600. On the one 
hand, this would reduce the asset gain subject to the recapture of de-
preciation rules by the amount of adjusted basis in excess of $600. On 
the other hand, it would introduce the need to reconcile for the fact 
that exactly this much extra depreciation was taken as a result of the 
inflated basis. 
2. The liability relief received: The taxpayer-seller has repaid his 
loan in accordance with the presumptions that governed its terms -
i.e., with the lesser of $1000 or the fair market value of the underlying 
asset at the time of its disposition. No gain or loss is realized, and no 
reconciliation is appropriate. 
Tufts held that the taxpayer in this situation should be treated as 
having realized asset gain equal to the difference between his adjusted 
basis ($800) and the face value of the mortgage liability relief he re-
ceived ($1000). This $200 would likely be characterized either as capi-
tal gain or section 1231 gain, depending on the nature of the asset. 
Any portion of the gain that represented excess depreciation would 
presumably be recaptured in accordance with the applicable rules. 150 
This is very nearly the same result as that yielded by the suggested 
analysis. Barnett's bifurcation analysis, on the other hand, results in 
no asset gain or loss and a $200 liability gain. 
If we are serious about systemic coherence, and insist on it 
throughout our analysis of borrowed funds, its implications turn out 
to be different in some circumstances, including Tufts itself, from 
those claimed by Barnett. And although the results of our coherent 
analysis differ from current federal income tax law in the context of 
many recourse loans, they are remarkably similar in the context of 
nonrecourse loans. 
2. A Significant Cost of Coherence 
Systemic rationality and coherence may well be desirable for a tax 
system to have. Most of us are doubtless inclined, at least, to think so. 
But other features might be desirable for our tax system as well. Un-
less we can show generally that systemic coherence trumps all other 
values - an argument that does not get made, even by those, like 
150. See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 303 n.2. 
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Barnett, who seem to thitik that systemic rationality and coherence 
provide sufficient reason for interpreting the law one way rather than 
another - normative arguments about a tax system must articu1ate 
and weigh a variety of values. Hence, even if the implications of co-
herence are as described in the previous section, I have not yet made 
the case for reforming current law to conform to my rationale and 
resuJts. 151 Indeed, it is not my aim here to make that case, but rather 
to show something about how recognizing the necessary functions of 
any tax system can help both in describing our own income tax system 
and in structuring normative arguments about it. In any case, one 
should note that the administrative cost of the preceding analysis of 
purchase money mortgages would be considerable. Just how consider-
able can begin to be seen by revisiting Examples A through D above, 
this time analyzing them from the perspective of the purchaser. 
EXAMPLE AP 
Mortgage Liability Asset 
Face value = $1000 Basis = $1000 
Cost to discharge= $1000 FMV = $1200 
Purchaser assumes the mortgage liability and pays an additional 
$200 to acquire the asset. 
1. The asset purchased: The purchaser has purchased an asset at 
a cost of $1200. His basis in the asset shou1d be $1200. 
2. The liability incurred: The purchaser has, in effect, borrowed 
$1000 of his $1200 purchase price. The borrowed $1000 is not cur-




Face value = $1000 
Cost to discharge = $1000 
Asset 
Basis = $1000 
FMV = $900 
Purchaser assumes the mortgage liability and acquires the asset 
plus an additional $100. 
1. The asset purchased: The purchaser has bought an asset for a 
net cost of $900 and, accordingly, his basis in the asset should be $900. 
2. The liability incurred: The purchaser has borrowed $1000 
which he has used to acquire $1000 of value (an asset worth $900 plus 
151. Since my results conform fairly well to both Crane and Tufts, such reform is not impos-
sibly impractical. 
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$100 in cash). This amount is not currently taxed on the assumption 
that it will be repaid in the future. 
EXAMPLE Gp 
Mortgage Liability Asset 
Face value = $1000 Basis = $1000 
Cost to discharge= $800 FMV = $1000 
(The prevailing interest rate for similar loans has 
gone up.) 
Purchaser assumes the mortgage liability and pays an additional 
$200 to acquire the asset. 
1. The asset purchased: The purchaser has acquired an asset 
worth $1000. One would, therefore, expect the purchase price to have 
been $1000. In fact, it was, since he paid $200 cash and agreed to pay 
an amount equivalent to the amount he would have to pay had he 
borrowed $800 for the same term at current interest rates. 152 If basis 
represents cost, the purchaser's basis in the asset should be $1000. But 
the face value of the mortgage is $1000, and that amount plus the 
additional cash which he paid would appear to give the purchaser a 
$1200 basis. 
2. The liability incu"ed: By undertaking the mortgage obligation 
the purchaser has achieved a current purchasing power of $800. This 
amount is not currently taxed on the assumption that it will be repaid 
in the future. But, once again, it must be noted that the face value of 
the liability is $1000. If the value of the liability were measured by its 
purchasing power at the time it was undertaken ($800), then the face 
value of the loan ($1000) woµld not be the standard against which 
future dispositions of the loan would be offset. If, for example, two 
years later, the asset was still worth $1000 and the face value of the 
unpaid mortgage was still $1000153 but its cost to discharge was now 
also $1000,154 the sale of the asset by the person I have called "the 
purchaser" for relief from the liability would seem to result in no gain 
or loss on the asset but in a $200 loss on the liability. In effect, the 
purchaser would have spent $1000 (his basis in the asset) in order to 
be relieved of what, in his hands, had started out to be an $800 debt. 
On the other hand, if the value of the liability were measured by its 
face value, regardless of fluctuations in its purchasing power, then the 
152. See supra discussion of Example C. 
153. Perhaps because its terms required periodic interest payments with a balloon payment 
of the principal at some future date. 
154. Perhaps because current market interest rates for similar loans had returned to those 
originally set forth by the terms of the loan. 
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purchaser's basis in the asset would be $1200 and the transaction in 
this example would result in neither gain nor loss on the liability, but 
in a $200 loss on the asset. 
EXAMPLE DP 
Mortgage Liability Asset 
Face value = $1000 Basis = $1000 
Cost to discharge = $1100 FMV = $1000 
(The prevailing interest rate for similar loans has 
gone down.) 
Purchaser assumes the mortgage liability and acquires the asset 
plus an additional $100. 
1. The asset purchased: The purchaser has bought an asset worth 
$1000 and has been given $100 as well. Clearly, a fair price for this 
package would be $1100. Because the purchaser agreed to pay back 
an amount equivalent to the amount he would have to repay had he 
borrowed $1100 for the same term at current interest rates, it would be 
reasonable to assign him.a basis of $1000 in the asset (his cost less the 
$100 he received with the asset). If the face value of the mortgage is 
determinative of basis, the buyer's basis in the asset would be $900 
($1000 obligation assumed less $100 cash received). 
2. The liability incurred: The purchaser here is in a position 
analogous to that of the purchaser in Example Cp. He has undertaken 
to pay back an amount equal to the amount he would have to repay 
had he borrowed $1100. This gives him a current purchasing power of 
$1100. He is not taxed currently because it is assumed that he will 
repay in the future. This example, no less than Example Cp, illustrates 
how the standard against which future dispositions of the loan are 
measured can differ from the loan's face value if the acquired asset is 
given a basis equal to its value and actual cost (here $1000) and the 
loan assumption is viewed as having contributed its actual purchasing 
power (here $1100) to the transaction. 
Bifurcation of transactions that involve both the exchange of an 
asset and the exchange of a liability would seem to require that the 
value of the liability be adjusted to reflect its current cost to discharge. 
If face value were always used as the measure of the value of the liabil-
ity, then there could be no fluctuation in the value of any given liabil-
ity155 and bifurcation would have no effective role. All gains and 
losses would be represented as attaching to the exchange of the asset. 
155. Of course, the amount of the liability could change as it was partially paid or as addi-
tional amounts were borrowed, but such changes are not fluctuations in the value of a given 
liability. 
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The seller in Example C would be said to have sold the asset for $1200 
(even though its fair market value was only $1000 and even though 
someone who paid fair price in any currency other than the assump-
tion of the outstanding mortgage liability would be treated as having 
paid $1000) and thereby as having realized a $200 gain on the asset. 
Consistently with that result, 156 the buyer in Example Cp would be 
given a $1200 basis in the asset. As the preceding discussion has 
shown, on the whole, the current federal income tax system in fact 
operates in this manner. It tends to treat the increase or decrease in 
the value of any liability relinquished or assumed in connection with 
an asset sale as if it had been assimilated into the price of the asset 
itself.157 
The actual purchasing power of a particular liability can fluctuate, 
however, as a result of differences in the prevailing interest rates. As 
long as these fluctuations are not accorded any special significance by 
the tax system, the system can operate using the dollar as a fungible 
standard for measuring gain, loss, and income. If bifurcation of the 
sort spelled out in Examples A through M(NR) were adhered to, and 
for tax purposes, the value of a liability were not automatically pegged 
to its face value but face value nonetheless governed the relationship 
between debtor and creditor, then accounting for the tax consequences 
of satisfying assumed obligations would become a different enterprise. 
Essentially, the face value of the dollar paid to satisfy an obligation 
would cease to function as the measure of the amount paid to satisfy 
the obligation. The complications arise because bifurcation allows a 
value different from the face value to be assigned to a liability for tax 
purposes, even though face value will necessarily continue to represent 
the amount that the borrower is contractually due to pay to the holder 
of the note. Thus, in Example Cp, if, three years after he had assumed 
it as part of his purchase price for the asset, the buyer were to pay off 
the entire outstanding mortgage liability of $1000 as per the terms of 
the original note, his tax treatment would vary in accordance with the 
purchasing power of the dollar. If its purchasing power at the end of 
three years were the same as it had been anticipated at the beginning 
of Year 1 that it would be, then paying off the debt with 1000 Year-3 
dollars would not have any tax consequences, even though the loan 
156. Consistency in the treatment of buyer and seller seems, at the least, a desirable feature. 
Coven apparently thinks that it is a necessary one. See Coven, supra note 126, at 77; see also 
Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 3, at 20. Without such consistency it would be possible for a 
seller to be treated as having received a different amount from the buyer for the asset from what 
the buyer is credited (through his basis) with having paid. 
157. An exception to this way of proceeding is suggested by Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire 
Co., 271 U.S. 170 (1926). 
June 1990] Foundations of Federal Income Tax 2093 
had been treated in Year 1 as having a purchasing power of only $800. 
This result is a straightforward consequence of the fact that the 
purchasing power ascribed to the loan assumption in Year 1 assumed 
a payback of $1000 at the end of Year 3 and necessarily made certain 
assumptions about what the value of 1000 Y ear-3 dollars would be. 
Things would become more complicated, however, if the purchasing 
power of a Y ear-3 dollar differed from what had been anticipated in 
Year 1. In that case, the satisfaction of the mortgage for $1000 at the 
end of Year 3 would mean either that the buyer had not paid back the 
entire amount that he had borrowed and therefore had, in effect, 
benefitted from the discharge of some of his debt, or that he had paid 
back more than he had borrowed. Under either description, the 
payback might well trigger a response by the income tax system. 
Embarking on a path that allows for the possibility that the face 
value of the dollar will not always be treated by the tax system as a 
fungible unit of measurement opens up a veritable Pandora's box of 
practical and theoretical difficulties. Any system, like the federal in-
come tax system, that ever measures what is taxed by comparing cur-
rent value with previous value needs some standard to serve as a 
common denominator. The dollar has traditionally served that pur-
pose. As the preceding examples and discussion have shown, the bi-
furcation of a transaction that involves both the exchange of an asset 
and the exchange of a liability into two distinct transa~tions does not 
allow the dollar to play this role, nor does it suggest a ready substitute. 
But this analysis has not attempted to articulate the practical or 
policy issues surrounding the specific choices that the federal income 
tax system might make with respect to the taxation of transactions 
involving purchase money mortgages, much less to resolve them. It is 
an effort, however, to provide a general conceptual framework within 
which those issues can be identified, articulated, understood, and 
debated. 
IV. POSTSCRIPT TO PARTS II AND III: WHEN To RECONCILE 
Each of the foregoing examples of reconciliation within the federal 
income tax system illustrates how it functions as a corrective device. 
Reconciliation involves the comparison of the actual current circum-
stances with a position taken on an earlier return with respect to some 
potentially taxable amount. When it operates, it adjusts the current 
year's taxable income if the comparison reveals that the earlier posi-
tion presumed a future that is relevantly different from what actually 
occurred. In this way it prevents at least some of the system's earlier 
choices about the treatment of potentially taxable amounts from being 
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irrevocable. At the same time, it determines whether and when to tax 
that potentially taxable amount. 
Although none of the foregoing examples focuses directly on the 
question of when reconciliation might be appropriate, they certainly 
suggest the beginnings of an answer. In each example, reconciliation 
is invoked only when events have shown, once and for all, that some 
presumption about the future that characterized an earlier year's treat-
ment of a potentially taxable amount has proved incorrect. 158 The rel-
evant future has in some sense been resolved. 
Not surprisingly, given the connection between reconciliation and 
the ultimate resolution of a contingent event, the identification of a 
mistake that triggers reconciliation often coincides with the realization 
of another potentially taxable amount. This is easily illustrated by my 
discussion of section 1245 recapture. 159 There, the event that made it 
certain that the earlier years' depreciation had been excessive was the 
sale of the depreciated asset. Any increase in the value of the asset was 
realized at the same time. Similarly, in Examples A through 
M(NR), 160 the. final disposition of the loan made it certain that the 
earlier year's report of taxable income hinged on a mistaken presump-
tion about the future. That disposition occurred at the same time the 
property securing the loan was sold or abandoned. In each instance, 
the event triggering reconciliation was also the event marking the real-
ization of any potentially taxable amounts arising from the apprecia-
tion of the asset. 
The frequent identity of a reconciliation event and a realization 
event has obscured the fact that reconciliation is different from realiza-
tion and functions within our system as a separate and distinct means 
for determining whether and when a potentially taxable amount will 
be recognized. This is doubtless at least a part of the reason why the 
conceptual vocabulary of the federal income tax system has not in-
cluded reconciliation. Instead the system has struggled unsuccessfully 
to account for all instances of taxation in terms of realization. This 
aggrandizement of realization has, in turn, necessarily led us to ignore 
the straightforward structural requirements common to any tax sys-
tem, including one that purports to tax income. This essay is an effort 
to begin to look directly at those requirements and their implications 
for the structure of the federal system. 
158. See White, supra note 9, at 502-05. 
159. See supra text accompanying notes 98-121. 
160. See supra section 111.B.1. 
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CONCLUSION 
I have claimed here that there are certain necessary questions that 
any tax system must ask. At the least, a system must make some de-
termination about whether it considers an item within its aegis, and 
for each such item, must determine whether to tax it, and, if so, 
when. 161 If this observation is correct, and I do not see how it cannot 
be, then any tax system, including the federal income tax system, can 
be described in terms that relate its particular features to the necessary 
functions. We can expect that any system will have some means of 
determining what falls within its province (even if that means is not 
terribly systematic)162 and some means of determining whether things 
within its compass will be taxed and when. In a simple system the 
initial division will obviate the later whether question, and only the 
when (now or later) question will remain.163 This paper begins to de-
scribe the federal income tax system in terms that relate its features to 
these necessary functions. 
The federal system is complex and does not neatly divide the 
world, first into a pile of things that are potentially taxable and a pile 
of things that are not, and then go about the task of deciding when to 
tax the things in the first pile. Instead, it conceives of exclusion 
(whether by initial exclusion or by deduction) from the tax base as a 
possible response to those items included in the first pile. This means 
that it asks the question whether to tax any item as well as the question 
when to tax it after it has made some initial at~empt at dividing the 
world into two piles.164 More importantly, it also means that the nor-
mative goals that determine the federal system's tax base are not fully 
specified by the criteria of initial division. Indeed, no criterion of ini-
tial division is ever really articulated by the system because it relies on 
the answers to the whether and, to a lesser extent, the when questions 
to determine the content of the tax base.165 
Any tax system, including the federal income tax system, will have 
161. See supra text accompanying notes 10-21. 
162. See supra text accompanying note 19. 
163. Actually in the simplest sort of system there is no when question either; once an item is 
identified, it is taxed. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14. 
164. Some attempt at division seems to have been made, since our system does not ask the 
whether and when to tax questions of everything in the world (my left big toe, for example). Or 
perhaps it does include everything as within its scope and can be conceived instead as determin-
ing not to tax my big toe in answer to the whether question. If so, everything in the world that is 
untaxed can be regarded as being potentially taxable and as having been excluded from the sys-
tem. The criteria for inclusion in the system's tax base would be identical to the criteria for 
determining whether to tax. The general structural model is unaffected by this possible interpre-
. tation of the federal system. 
165. See supra text accompanying notes 14-17. 
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mechanisms for answering the whether and when to tax questions 
which may be more or less systematic. The federal system explicitly 
identifies realization as playing a central role in its determinations of 
whether and when to tax. In fact, however, the federal system also 
relies importantly on another, unarticulated, mechanism to make 
these determinations. I call this mechanism "reconciliation." 
Reconciliation has considerable descriptive and explanatory 
power. Distinguishing it allows us to give a more coherent account of 
a number of phenomena in the federal income tax system than we can 
give with the traditional conceptual vocabulary. But it is important to 
realize that coherence and rationality are only one (two?) of a variety 
of aspirations that we might have for a tax system. Thus, whenever a 
coherent account of an actual phenomenon within a system has impli-
cations for the description of certain other parts of the system, and the 
further descriptions turn out not to fit the facts, we cannot simply as-
sume that the best course would be either to reform or to interpret the 
law so as to increase its coherence. Sometimes other, often competing, 
values, such as administrability, equity, economic growth, or political 
expediency are relevant to the question of what the law ought to be or 
how it should be interpreted. Self-conscious articulation and explora-
tion of those values and their importance ought to be a goal of norma-
tive discussion about the content of the income tax system. 
The federal income tax system has become grotesquely complex. 
On the one hand, the temptation to declare that it no longer has any 
structural foundations is great. On the other hand, the importance of 
a structure that can be looked to to help us understand what we have 
and to provide us with a conceptual apparatus within which to focus 
our critical and reforming efforts is also great. This paper is borne of 
the belief that there is reason to pursue the latter course. 
